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INTRODUCTION

Marijuana and hemp are varieties of the cannabis plant. The
marijuana plant appears in three types: sativa, indica, and a
lesser-known non-psychoactive plant called ruderalis. 1 The sativa
and indica plants have hundreds of compounds including
psychoactive and non-psychoactive cannabinoids.2 The major
psychoactive compound and cannabinoid within these two plants
is called Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”). 3 Hemp, which
is sometimes confused with marijuana, is a botanical class of
cannabis sativa but has only small amounts of THC relative to the
amount grown to produce marijuana. 4
“Both hemp and
marijuana come from the same cannabis species but are
genetically distinct and are further distinguished by use, chemical
makeup, and cultivation methods.” 5
In 1970, with the passage of the Controlled Substances Act 6
(“CSA”), all cannabis varieties, including hemp, were designated
Schedule I controlled substances (along with heroin, LSD, peyote,
and ecstasy). 7 While marijuana remains illegal under the CSA,
hemp was subsequently removed from the CSA due to the
passage of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018—more
commonly known as the 2018 Farm Act. 8 This has led to the
See Why Weed Strains Look Different and How to Tell Them Apart, SEATTLE
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/sponsored/why-weedstrains-look-different-and-how-to-tell-them-apart/. See also Cannabis Ruderalis:
What Is It and How Is It Different From Sativa or Indica?, MED. MARIJUANA INC.,
https://medicalmarijuanainc.com/cannabis-ruderalis/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
2 See Zerrin Atakan, Cannabis, A Complex Plant: Different Compounds and
Different Effects on Individuals, 2(6) THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY, 241, 244 (Dec. 2012).
3 See M.A. Costa et al., The Psychoactive Compound of Cannabis Sativa, Delta9-Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) Inhibits the Human Trophoblast Cell Turnover,
TOXICOLOGY, 94 (Aug. 2015).
4 Sian Ferguson, Hemp v. Marijuana: What’s the Difference?, HEALTHLINE
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health/hemp-vs-marijuana.
5 Kentucky Hempsters, Hemp 101: What is Hemp, What’s it Used For, and Why
is it Illegal?, LEAFLY (Jul. 14, 2015), https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis101/hemp-101-what-is-hemp-whats-it-used-for-and-why-is-it-illegal.
6 See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT (CSA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 117TH CONGRESS (2021).
7 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
8 See Hemp Production and the 2018 Farm Bill, (Jul. 25, 2019) (testimony of
Amy Abernathy, M.D., PhD., Principal Deputy Commissioner, Office of the
1
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propagation of hemp derivatives like cannabidiol (“CBD”) and
Delta-8 along with the proliferation of hemp products. 9 To date
and pursuant to the 2014 Farm Act and the 2018 Farm Act, fortysix states, two territories, and forty-five American Indian Tribes
have enacted legislation to establish hemp production programs,
allow for hemp cultivation research, or to approve hemp
cultivation programs. 10 Hemp is used to make a variety of
commercial and industrial products, including rope, textiles,
clothing, shoes, food, paper, bioplastics, insulation, and biofuel. 11
The global industrial hemp market attained a value of USD 4.7
billion in 2020. 12
The cannabis hemp plant derivative, CBD, can be extracted
from both the hemp and marijuana plants if its THC
concentration does not exceed 0.3 percent THC weight. 13 “Any
plant containing less than a defined concentration of the
psychoactive THC is classified as hemp.” 14 This concentration
ranges from 0.2 percent of dry weight in most European
countries, to 0.3 percent in Canada and the United States. 15 CBD
Commissioner).
9 Vishal Vivek, A List of Legal Hemp States in the USA, HEMP FOUND. (Feb. 7,
2020), https://hempfoundation.net/a-list-of-legal-hemp-states-in-the-usa/.
10 Global Industrial Hemp Market Report and Forecast 2021–2026: Favourable
Regulations Aid Growth with 22.5% CAGR Forecast Between 2021 and 2026, BUS.

WIRE (Aug. 19, 2021, 7:30 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20210819005407/en/Global-Industrial-Hemp-Market-Report-and-Forecast-20212026-Favourable-Regulations-Aid-Growth-with-22.5-CAGR-Forecast-Between-2021and-2026—-ResearchAndMarkets.com; see also Status of State and Tribal Hemp
Production Plans for USDA Approval, USDA, https://www.ams.usda.gov/rulesregulations/hemp/state-and-tribal-plan-review (last visited May 26, 2022).
11 See Hemp, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/plant/
hemp (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).

See Global Industrial Hemp Market Report and Forecast 2021–2026:
Favourable Regulations Aid Growth with 22.5% CAGR Forecast Between 2021 and
2026–ResearchandMarkets.com, YAHOO (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/
12

now/global-industrial-hemp-market-report-113000241.html.

13 See CBD Products are Everywhere. But Do They Work?, HARV. HEALTH PUB.
(Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/cbd-productsare-everywhere-but-do-they-work.
14 Dinesh Adhikary et al., Medical Cannabis and Industrial Hemp Tissue
Culture: Present Status and Future Potential, FRONTIER PLACE SCI., 1, 2 (Mar.
2021).
15 Id. at 2 (noting that the dry weight ranges differ among countries from 0.2
percent to one percent, with rates in China and Brazil at 0.3 percent and rates
at one percent in Switzerland, Uruguay, Columbia, Mexico, and several Australian
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products are now widely available to consumers through a variety
of channels such as convenience stores, tobacco stores,
newsstands, pharmacies, and the internet. 16 The CBD “global
cannabidiol market size was valued at USD 2.8 billion in 2020
and is expected to expand at a compound annual growth rate
(CAGR) of 21.2% from 2021 to 2028.” 17
The proliferation of CBD and marijuana derivatives is
impacting the courts, law enforcement, and workplace settings.
It is creating a confusing testing environment for laboratories
and potentially serious legal outcomes for citizens. CBD and
Delta-8 users cannot rely on the fact that CBD is legal everywhere
and Delta-8 is legal in some states because they may unknowingly
be testing positive for illegal THC. A CBD Oracle Lab Study
showed that some Delta-8 products contained 7,700 percent of
the legal Delta-9-THC limit, which still remains federally illegal
under the CSA. 18 Lab tests done on CBD products by Ellipse
Analytics found more than half of the two hundred products
tested were inaccurately labeled and lab results showed that a
quarter of them—more than fifty products—falsely claimed they
were “THC-free.” 19 This is compounded by the fact that
laboratories, when testing, cannot easily delineate between low
levels of THC in hemp and higher THC amounts in marijuana.
Formerly, “laboratories had to identify hairs on marijuana
flowers and test for the presence of cannabinoids, a process that
required just a few minutes and a test strip that turned purple
when it was positive.” 20 These lab tests are now more complex
states).
16

See CBD Products for Sale,

(last visited May 25, 2022).

CBDMD,

https://www.cbdmd.com/cbd-products

Cannabidiol Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By Source Type
(Hemp, Marijuana), By Distribution Channel (B2B, B2C), By End-use (Medical,
Personal Use), By Region, and Segment Forecasts, 2021–2028, GRAND VIEW RSCH.
17

(Feb. 2021).
18 Lee Johnson, CBD Oracle Lab Study Shows Some Delta-8 Products are
7700% Over the Legal Delta-9 THC Limit, CBD ORACLE (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://cbdoracle.com/news/delta-8-thc-products-market-study-consumer-safety-andlegality/.
19 Can CBD Get You Fired Even Though It’s Legal?, ABC 13 NEWS (Oct. 3,
2019),
https://wlos.com/news/nation-world/can-cbd-get-you-fired-even-though-itslegal.
20 Nicholas
Bogel-Burroughs, Texas Legalized Hemp, Not Marijuana,
Governor Insists as Prosecutors Drop Pot Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 19, 2019),
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and consequently more expensive.21
While on its face unwittingly and mistakenly using illegal
THC in lieu of CBD may not seem troublesome, some users may
suffer unfortunate personal and legal consequences.
For
example, a citizen who suffers from substance use disorders and
practices a zero-tolerance alcohol and drug regime could lose
their sobriety; a citizen who is mandated by a zero-tolerance drug
policy through an employer may lose their job; a parolee or
probationer who is mandated to practice a zero drug policy may
have their parole or probation revoked; a driver may be charged
and convicted with marijuana-impaired driving; a prospective
employee may not be hired, or a defendant may be denied entry
into a drug court program or be terminated from one. These
consequences all materialize in the name of a positive THC test.
People who have been injured by the mischaracterization of CBD
as legal are bringing lawsuits against those companies who claim
that their CBD products are legal concentrations, even though
they ultimately tested positive for illegal THC. 22
Although there have been many past and present
congressional attempts to declassify or reclassify marijuana under
the CSA and there have been numerous legal challenges to the
CSA classification, to date, we are at status quo with legal hemp
and CBD and federally illegal marijuana. 23 The hemp and CBD
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/us/texas-hemp-marijuana-legalization.html.
21 See Jon Schuppe, ‘I Feel Lucky, for Real’: How Legalizing Hemp Accidentally
Helped Marijuana Suspects, NBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2019, 1:47 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/i-feel-lucky-real-how-legalizinghempaccidentally-helped-marijuana-n1043371; Jolie McCullough & Alex Samuels,

This Year, Texas Passed a Law Legalizing Hemp. It Also Has Prosecutors Dropping
Hundreds of Cases, CBS 7 (Jul. 3, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.cbs7.com

/content/news/This-year-Texas-passed-a-law-legalizing-hemp-It-also-hasprosecutors-dropping-hundreds-of-marijuana-cases-512257731.html.
22 Josh Long, Pennsylvania Woman Sues CBD Company After Failed Drug Test,
NAT. PRODS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.naturalproductsinsider.com/
litigation/pennsylvania-woman-sues-cbd-company-after-failed-drug-test;
Barry
Nixon, A Lawsuit Waiting to Happen: Get Cannabis Testing Right or You Will End
Up in Court!, PREEMPLOYMENT DIRECTORY (Nov. 20, 2019, 7:24 AM),
https://preemploymentdirectory.com/a-lawsuit-waiting-to-happen-get-cannabistesting-right-or-you-will-end-up-in-court/.
23 State Industrial Hemp Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/agriculture-and-rural-development/state-industrialhemp-statutes.aspx; see Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana L. (NORML) v.
Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NORML v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 559 F.2d
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quagmire, piecemeal decriminalization by states, and differing
state legalization of marijuana, all influence court decisions on
the issue of cannabis search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The overall legalization of
cannabis (including hemp) is impacting searches in homes, land,
curtilage, vehicles, schools, workplaces, body specimens, and other
scenarios, and is expanding and contracting exceptions to the search
warrant requirement.24
This Article will first briefly review the legal history of hemp
and marijuana in the United States and examine the established
legal constructs under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution’s search and seizure provision. Second, this Article
will explore past and developing state and federal appellate and
U.S. Supreme Court cases in a variety of cannabis search and
seizure settings. Third, this exploration will be followed by a full
discussion on the exceptions to the warrant requirement and
other search contexts in relation to cannabis searches. Finally,
the Article will conclude by identifying trends related to the
topic.
II.

HISTORY OF MARIJUANA & HEMP

The hemp plant and marijuana plants have a protracted
legal history in the United States. In the early days of the
colonial settlements and prior to 1937, the forebears owned
hemp plantations, and hemp and marijuana were simultaneously
legal. 25 Indeed, “[i]t was a common crop in the colonies and
fairly widespread. . . . at one point in the early 1600s, all settlers
in the Jamestown colony were required to grow marijuana.” 26 At
that time, hemp was primarily used for shipbuilding. 27 Prior to
735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); NORML v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123 (D.D.C. 1980); All. for
Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
United
States
v.
Pickard,
100
F.
Supp.
3d
981
(E.D.
Cal.
2015); Washington v. Sessions, No. 17 Civ. 5625, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30586,
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018); Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2019).
24 See BUS. WIRE, supra note 10; see also USDA, supra note 10.
25 See Hemp and Our Founding Fathers, WORLDHISTORY.US (May 22, 2017),
https://worldhistory.us/american-history/hemp-and-our-founding-fathers.php.
26 Erin Krcatovich, The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, STUDY.COM (Nov. 22,
2015), https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-marijuana-tax-act-of-1937.html.
27 See Oscar H. Will III, The Forgotten History of Hemp Cultivation in
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the late 1950s, hemp in the United States was considered an
agricultural commodity, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) supported its production. 28
While the hemp plant was supported historically, marijuana
plants, those that have higher levels of THC, did not fare as well.
This traditional lack of support is perhaps because the hemp
plant is considered utilitarian, while the marijuana plant is
associated with its psychoactive effects or “high.” Irrespectively,
in the past, marijuana (usually marketed as “cannabis”) could be
found openly on pharmacy shelves as a medicinal elixir for a
variety of ailments. 29 In 1916, however, individual states began to
outlaw marijuana, and by 1931, a total of twenty-nine states had
done so. 30 During this period there were rising concerns about
marijuana use being harmful, some of which appeared to be
racially motivated. 31 More saliently, the lumber, paper, and nylon
industries saw industrial hemp as a competitive threat to their
industries. 32 Those industries began to assert their political
influence to make hemp, and consequently marijuana, less
accessible. 33 Until today, marijuana and hemp were somewhat
inextricable.
Some have argued that the lumber, paper, and nylon
industries’ economic interests served as the precipitating factor
for the congressional support and passage of the Marijuana Tax
Act, which simultaneously convoluted and taxed the use of
marijuana and, inextricably, hemp.34 The Marijuana Tax Act of
America, FARM COLLECTOR (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.farmcollector.com/farm-

life/strategic-fibers/.
28 RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44742, DEFINING HEMP: A FACT SHEET,
1, 1 (Mar. 22, 2019) https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44742.pdf (noting that “[s]trictly
speaking, the CSA does not make growing hemp illegal, but makes it illegal to grow
without a DEA permit.”).
29 See A Social History of America’s Most Popular Drugs, PBS FRONTLINE,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/buyers/socialhistory.html.
30 See Marijuana Timeline, PBS FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/dope/etc/cron.html.
31 Matt Thompson, The Mysterious History of ‘Marijuana’, NPR (Jul. 22, 2013,
11:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/07/14/201981025/themysterious-history-of-marijuana.
32 Hemp Politics–Why Was Hemp Made Illegal in 1973?, HEMP FRONTIERS (Apr.
11, 2006), https://hempfrontiers.com/why-was-hemp-made-illegal-in-1937/.
33
34

Id.
See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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1937 was the law of the land until the Act was challenged in
1969. 35 It was challenged on Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination grounds in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court
case, Leary v. United States, which overturned the Act. 36 Leary,
who had been transporting marijuana in his vehicle, claimed that
by filling out the necessary forms to comply with the Marijuana
Tax Act, he would be legally incriminating himself. 37 Leary
argued that he would be admitting to transporting and
possessing marijuana in violation of Texas law that had made it
illegal to do so. 38 Although Leary was convicted, his Fifth
Amendment challenge resulted in the nullification of the
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 as the federal government, on the
heels of this decision, passed the CSA.39 In the interim between
the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 and the CSA, there were some
intervening drug laws like the Boggs Act of 1951 40 and the
Narcotics Control Act (“NCA”) of 1956. 41
Hemp again took center stage with the passage of the Farm
Act in 2018.42 According to the Center for Disease Control
(“CDC”), in 2017, “[fourteen percent] of American adults smoked
cigarettes,” which [was] a sharp decrease from the 20.9 percent of
American adults who smoked in 2005. 43 In the past 20 years,
tobacco production in the state has declined 54.0 percent, to
117.1 million pounds harvested in 2021.44 Providing that
“Kentucky—the state with the second-largest tobacco harvest in
the United States (North Carolina comes in first)—is responsible
35
36
37
38

Id. at 6.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
Id.

Schedules of Controlled Substances, 21 U.S.C. § 812.
Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767, 782 (1951).
41 Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 728-84, 68A Stat. 562, 569 (1956).
42 Angelica LaVito, CDC Says Smoking Rates Fall to Record Low in US, CNBC
(Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/cdc-says-smoking-rates-fall-torecord-low-in-us.html#:~:text=An%20estimated%2014%20percent%20of%20adult
s%20in%20the,figure%20and%2042.4%20percent%20of%20adults%20smoked%20c
igarettes.
39
40

43

Id.

Andre Bourque, How Hemp is Giving Renewed Life to America’s Tobacco
Farmers, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
44

andrebourque/2019/03/25/how-hemp-is-giving-renewed-life-to-americas-tobaccofarmers/?sh=251906854726.
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for almost a quarter of that output.” 45 The reduction in the
tobacco crop forced many farmers to look into other crops.
Although one could say that economics motivated the passage of
the Act, with tobacco farmers substituting for the lumber barons,
it was also geopolitical.
After the 2014 Farm Bill passed, the United States
government, under the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”), began to pilot and approve plans submitted by states
and American Indian Tribes for the domestic production of
industrial hemp.46 This ultimately led to the passage of the 2018
Farm Act, which U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)
supported, because the people in his home state of Kentucky saw
hemp as a lucrative replacement for tobacco. 47 Speaking on the
Senate floor prior to the 2018 Farm Act’s passage, U.S. Senator
McConnell stated, “[a]t a time when farm income is down and
growers are struggling, industrial hemp is a bright spot of
agriculture’s future.” 48
This has been, to date, the only
marijuana-related congressional bill supported by Senator
McConnell. 49

45 Bourree Lam, From Growing Tobacco to Growing Hemp, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/hempfarmer/505604/; RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32725, HEMP AS AN
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY (Jun. 22, 2018); see also David W. Olson et al., Hope
for Hemp: New Opportunities and Challenges for an Old Crop, USDA ECON. RSCH.
SEV. (Jun. 9, 2020), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2020/june/hope-forhemp-new-opportunities-and-challenges-for-an-old-crop/; The Shrinking Role of
Tobacco Farming and Tobacco Product Manufacturing in Kentucky’s Economy,
CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/
factsheets/0347.pdf (last visited August 3, 2022).
46 Legislative Summary: Agriculture, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. AND
MUSEUM,
https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/legislative-summary/
agriculture (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
47 Bourque, supra note 44; see generally BUS. WIRE, supra note 10.
48 Bourque, supra note 44.
49 See Niels Lesniewski, Mitch McConnell Touting Victory with Hemp
Legalization on Farm Bill, ROLL CALL (Dec. 11, 2018), https://rollcall.com/
2018/12/11/mitch-mcconnell-touting-victory-with-hemp-legalization-on-farm-bill/;
Jacqueline Thomsen, McConnell: I Won’t Support Legalizing Marijuana, THE HILL
(May 8,
2018),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/386791-mcconnell-i-wontsupport-legalizing-marijuana/.
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Unlike hemp, seeking to remove or reclassify marijuana out
from under the CSA has met with a more tortured history and
with little success. Today, the CSA still classifies marijuana as a
most dangerous drug.50 Many bills to either reclassify or
declassify marijuana under the CSA have failed or are pending
without much movement. 51 As of the end of 2021, there are
many marijuana-related bills sitting in committees, some of which
took whole-cloth approaches while others are piecemeal. 52 This
list does not include all of the marijuana bills that have
languished or died prior to 2021. 53 Additionally, to date, despite
the many legal challenges to the marijuana classification, not one
legal case has successfully overturned the marijuana classification
under the CSA.54
This leaves the United States with a mishmash of marijuana
laws, with some states and localities decriminalizing small
amounts of marijuana possession.55 Some states have full-blown
50 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–
971); see also Melissa Kuipers Blake & Osiris Morel, Cannabis Legislation Wrap Up
for 2021, JD SUPRA (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cannabislegislation-wrap-up-for-2021-5746328/.
51 Blake & Morel, supra note 50.
52 A few such bills include: the Marijuana in Federally Assisted Housing Parity
Act (H.R. 3212), which was re-introduced by Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes
Norton (D-D.C.) and referred to the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services;
the Marijuana Data Collection Act (S.1456) introduced by Senators Bob Menendez
(D-NJ) and Rand Paul (R-KY) and referred to the Senate HELP Committee; the
Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act (H.R. 1996), a bill passed by the
U.S. House on April 19, 2021, and its coinciding bill, S.910, that was introduced in
the Senate on March 23, 2021; the Veterans Medical Marijuana Safe Harbor Act
introduced by Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) on April 16, 2021; the Veterans
Cannabis Use for Safe Healing Act (H.R. 430) introduced in the House and
referred to the U.S. House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs; the Marijuana 1-to-3
Act (H.R. 365) introduced and referred to the U.S. House Energy & Commerce
Committee and U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Cannabidiol and Marihuana
Research Expansion Act (S.253) that has a bipartisan group of eleven sponsors and
was introduced in the Senate in February 2021 before being referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
53 See John Hudak, The Numbers for Drug Reform in Congress Don’t Add Up,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 22, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/12/22/thenumbers-for-drug-reform-in-congress-dont-add-up/.
54 See Mary A. Celeste & Melia Thompson-Dudiak, Has the Marijuana
Classification Under the Controlled Substances Act Outlived Its Definition?, 20
CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 18, 20 (2020).
55 See Michael Hartman, Cannabis Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Jul.
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or limited medical marijuana laws. 56 Other states are without any
medical marijuana laws, and some have recreational marijuana
laws. 57 Without a uniform federal approach to marijuana
legalization, the states will continue to differ in their approaches
to the legalization of cannabis. These varied existing and
developing cannabis laws are impacting the courts in a variety of
ways, including in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The
new legal stance on marijuana and hemp, along with the
similarities between them, are creating novel search and seizure
issues. It is no longer clear that marijuana possession or use
constitutes illegal activity or that marijuana is illegal contraband.
Various parties are now asking courts who have once held that
the odor of marijuana alone may serve to establish probable
cause to secure a warrant, or, who have in the past considered
marijuana to be illegal contraband, to reconsider the matter.
By way of example, prior to Illinois passing medical and
recreational marijuana laws, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the uncorroborated detection of the cannabis odor by a trained
and experienced police officer provided probable cause for that
officer to conduct a warrantless search. 58 In contrast, after
Illinois’s medical and recreational marijuana legalization, in a
recent lower court ruling from Whiteside County, Illinois, the
court held that the smell of marijuana does not give probable
cause for officers to do a warrantless search during traffic stops.59
Short of a change to the marijuana classification under the
CSA, or U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing cannabis
search and seizure issues in the face of these new cannabis laws,
6, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview
.aspx.
56 See State Medical Cannabis Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATES LEGIS. (Nov. 29,
2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx; see
also Medical Marijuana State-by-State Overview, FED’N OF STATE MED. BOARDS 1
(2021).
57 See Claire Hansen et al., Where is Marijuana Legal? A Guide to Marijuana
Legalization, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.usnews.com
/news/best-states/articles/where-is-marijuana-legal-a-guide-to-marijuanalegalization.
58 People v. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d 77, 87 (1985).
59 Sydney Dorner, Smell of Marijuana No Longer Probable Cause for Illinois
Car Searches, FOX ILL. (Nov. 21, 2021), https://foxillinois.com/news/local/smell-ofmarijuana-no-longer-probable-cause-for-illinois-car-searches (noting that the case
may still be appealed by the state).
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the courts will continue to vary on cannabis search and seizure
issues. Prior to more fully discussing the varying state and
federal cases on the issue of hemp and marijuana legalization
and decriminalization and its relationship to cannabis searches
and seizures, it is necessary to review the Fourth Amendment
legal constructs.
III.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSTRUCTS FOR SEARCH AND
SEIZURE

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution’s search
and seizure provision states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, 60 supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 61
The provisions of the Fourth Amendment are applicable to
the states. 62 A court will uphold a search if there is a warrant for
the search that complies with the criteria as set forth in the
Fourth Amendment. 63 It includes a sworn detailed statement

60 Ill.v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (stating that in order to obtain a search
warrant, the court must consider whether based on the totality of the information
there is a fair probability that contraband, evidence, or a person will be found in a
particular place).
61 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For an extensive discussion on the Fourth
Amendment, see CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, 103RD CONG., S. Doc. No. 103-6, at 1197-1269 (1st Sess. 1992).
62 Wolf v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); see also Ark. v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (reasoning that
states may grant citizens greater protections based on state constitutions, but not on
the Fourth Amendment, however, the U.S. Supreme Court speaks the last word on
the Fourth Amendment).
63 See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 61,
at 1197-1269; Sara J. Berman, Arrest Warrants: What’s in Them, How Police Gets
Them, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arrest-warrants-how-whenpolice-get-them.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
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made by a law enforcement officer before a neutral judge 64 that
details the person or place to be searched with specificity 65 and
that law enforcement officers show that there is probable cause to
justify the search. 66 Because a definition of probable cause is not
within the Fourth Amendment itself, it has become one of court
constructs. 67 The U.S. Supreme Court has “defined ‘probable
cause’ as an officer’s reasonable belief, based on circumstances
known to that officer, that a crime has occurred or is about to
occur.” 68
A court will also uphold a search if the defendant has legal
authority over the items or places to be searched and voluntarily
consents to the search. 69 However, a search made pursuant to a
warrant “cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it
turns out that the warrant was invalid.” 70 Additionally, a court
will uphold a search if the search falls within a legally recognized
exception to the warrant requirement. 71 A warrantless search
under one of the sanctioned exceptions requires the same
probable cause standard required to secure a valid search

The authority for a warrantless search extends beyond just law enforcement
in a variety of other contexts like school officials, government employment, prisons,
and drug testing. See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note
61 at 1197–1269. Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971).
65 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004).
66 United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted); Zurcher v. Stanf. Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978), superseded by statute
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa; see also Probable Cause, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited May 25, 2022).
67 Sara J. Berman, When the Police Can Make an Arrest: Probable Cause,
NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-police-can-make-arrestprobable-cause.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
68 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (reasoning that an
officer may establish probable cause with witness statements and other evidence,
including hearsay evidence that would not be admissible at trial because an officer’s
suspicion or belief, by itself, is not sufficient to establish probable cause.); Aguilar v.
Tex., 378 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1964), overruled by Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
The Search Warrant Requirement in Criminal Investigations, JUSTIA (Oct. 2021),
https://www.justia.com/criminal/procedure/warrant-requirement/.
69 Fernandez v. Cal., 571 U.S. 292 (2014). For an extensive list of consent cases,
see Consent, CASE LAW 4 COPS, http://www.caselaw4cops.net/searchand
seizure/consent.htm (last visited May 25, 2022).
70 Bumper v. N.C., 391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968) (footnote omitted).
71 Probable
Cause,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
64
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warrant. 72 The probable cause requirement for a search may not
be necessary or has a lower standard of reasonableness in some
specialized arenas including school searches, government offices,
prisons, probation and parole regulation, and drug testing for
public employees. 73
Despite the high constitutional protective standards under
the Fourth Amendment, the exceptions to the warrant
requirement for a search are numerous. The exceptions include
the search incident to arrest exception, 74 the automobile
exception, 75 the exigent circumstance exception, 76 the plain view
exception, 77 which sometimes includes “plain smell,” 78 limited
“open fields” exceptions, 79 the limited pat-down and stop and
frisk exceptions,80 the crimes committed in the presence of an

72 See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971) (reasoning that standards
must be at least as stringent for warrantless arrests as for obtaining a warrant).
73 See N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 327 (1985); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 711-12 (1987); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984); Griffin v. Wis.,
483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987) (holding that the search under Wisconsin law was lawful
under the Fourth Amendment based on information from the police detective that
there was or might be contraband in the probationer’s apartment); Samson v. Cal.,
547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006) (holding that suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful
under California law and that the search in this case was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment); and Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec’s. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620
(1989).
74 Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Approval of warrantless searches
pursuant to arrest first appeared in dicta in several cases. See Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). But see Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373
(2014) (holding that police must obtain a warrant to search a person’s cell phone
after an arrest).
75 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
76 See United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998) cert. denied;
Ky. v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011); Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Missouri
v. McNeely, 567 U.S. 968 (2012); Birchfield v. N.D., 136 579 U.S. 438 (2016);
Mitchell v. Wis., 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
77 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
78 See People v. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d 77 (1985).
79 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984).
80 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Fla. v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)
(holding that a person’s refusal to cooperate is not sufficient for reasonable
suspicion); Ill. v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (reasoning that a person’s
flight in a high crime area after seeing police was sufficient for reasonable suspicion
to stop and frisk).
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officer exception, 81 the community caretaking limited exception, 82
the DUI checkpoints and borders exception, 83 the administrative
authorities searches exception in public schools, government
offices, and prisons; the drug testing of public and transportation
employees exceptions, 84 and the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.85
Over the decades, U.S. Supreme Court case law has
developed these exceptions to the warrant requirement for a
warrantless search. In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court was
“closely divided on which standard to apply.” 86 In fact, “the
balance tipped in favor of the view that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable, with a few carefully prescribed exceptions.” 87
Over time and “guided by the variable expectation of privacy
approach to coverage of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
broadened its view of permissible exceptions and of the scope of
those exceptions.” 88 While the paramount consideration for these
exceptions was historically based on the “reasonableness” of the
search, 89 the focus of the warrantless search exceptions were
broadened by the U.S. Supreme Court to include privacy
considerations.90 A hierarchy of protected places has since
developed. For example, the home has the highest expectation

81 Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 504 (1885); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959).
82 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (reasoning not followed in
many states).
83 See Michigan Department of State Police et al., Petitioners v. Rick Sitz et al.,
496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
(1985); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
84 See N.Y. v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691(1987); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec’s. Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
85 Ariz. v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011);
Ill. v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); Herring v. United States, 555 US 135 (2009).
86 See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 61,
at 1203.
87
88
89

Id.
Id.
See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352–53 (1977)

(unanimous opinion); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Mich. v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978); Mincey v. Ariz., 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)
(unanimous opinion); Ark. v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 743, 758 (1979); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824–25 (1982).
90 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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of privacy, 91 whereas a vehicle has a lesser expectation of
privacy.92
The hallmark of the Fourth Amendment analysis to establish
probable cause for searches is whether a person has a
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” 93
The United States Supreme Court has affected searches in a
myriad of places including, but not limited to, on persons,
personal effects and furnishings, automobiles, houses,
apartments, motel rooms, offices, schools, land and curtilage, the
workplace, electronic devices, and body specimens.94 How
privacy protection plays in the context of probable cause for a
warrant or warrantless marijuana-based search is still evolving.
While the level of expectations varies with the place searched,
sometimes the method used for the search can also be at issue;
for example, a search that uses an airplane is less intrusive than
the use of infrared technology. 95 It is also dependent on whether
a state has decriminalized or legalized marijuana. 96 If marijuana
possession is permissible or decriminalized by state law, then the
odor of marijuana may not mean that there is criminal activity.
Moreover, whether a state offers greater protection than under
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution can also play a
role in the extent of the search. 97 Finally, “[s]tate courts cannot
rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of
the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of
See Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 582 n.17 (1980).
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1977); Rakas v. Ill., 439
U.S. 128, 154 (1978); Del. v. Prouse, 99 U.S. 1391, 1398 (1979); see also Fourth
Amendment––Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Automobile Searches, 70 J.
91
92

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 506 (1979) (providing an extensive discussion about
the automobile exception and the expectation of privacy in automobile searches).
93 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S at
359).
94 See generally CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note
61 at 1203 (explaining the various types of protection awarded by the Fourth
Amendment).
95 Caren Chesler, A Whiff of Pot Alone No Longer Airtight Probable Cause for
Police To Search Cars in Several States, WASH. POST (June 26, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/marijuana-police-probablecause/2021/06/26/9d984f8e-d36c-11eb-a53a-3b5450fdca7a_story.html.
96 Fourth
Amendment,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
97

Id.

CELESTE (DO NOT DELETE)

9/15/2022 9:05 PM

CANNABIS CONUNDRUM

2022]

505

individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal
law.” 98
IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

In 1985, one commentator cataloged twenty exceptions to
the warrant requirement, including “automobile searches . . .
border searches . . .
administrative searches of
regulated
businesses . . . exigent circumstances . . . search[es] incident to
nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat
boarding
for
document
checks . . .
welfare searches . . .
inventory searches . . .
airport searches . . .
and
school
searches[es].” 99
There are additional exceptions that the
commentator has not noted, which include mobile home
searches,100 searches of offices of government employees, 101 “stop
and frisk,” “open fields,” “plain sight-view,” (sometimes referred
to as doctrine) “plain smell” (sometimes referred to as doctrine),
and public and private employment searches that have search
and testing mandates. 102 For example, since public employees
work for the government, the public employer’s actions are by
definition “state action” subject to the Bill of Rights. 103
Therefore, employees of any level of government are protected
by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable search
and seizure.104 However, private employers are not engaging in
state action and thus the constitutional protections do not apply,
therefore, private sector employees have lesser protections
against workplace searches than those of the public sector. 105
Assuming that the circumstances and standards of those
98 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
99 Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.

1468, 1473–74 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
100 Cal. v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 406 (1985).
101 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).
102 Scott Thompson, Private-Sector Vs. Public Sector Workplace Searches,
HOUS. CHRON. (May 17, 2022), https://work.chron.com/privatesector-vs-publicsector
-workplace-searches-28187.html.
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Id.
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warrantless searches are upheld, the exceptions seem to consume
the Fourth Amendment protection.
A. Stop & Frisk
The probable cause standard for searches is not to be
confused with reasonable suspicion for a legal stop, which is not
considered a search and most importantly, not considered a
seizure.106 A “seizure” of a place or object is any action by the
government that limits your ability to use your property. 107 For
example, if the police impound your car or prevent you from
entering your house—a seizure has occurred, requiring a
warrant. 108 A seizure may also be applicable to the taking of body
specimens. 109 The Supreme Court has characterized reasonable
suspicion as the sort of common sense conclusion about human
behavior on which practical people are entitled to rely. 110 It has
also defined reasonable suspicion as requiring only something
more than an “unarticulated hunch.” 111 Reasonable suspicion
requires facts or circumstances that give rise to more than a bare,
imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion. 112
Reasonable
suspicion means that any reasonable person would suspect that a
crime was in the process of being committed, had been
committed, or was going to be committed very soon.

106 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (“Although an officer’s
reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop . . . the likelihood of
criminal activity need not arise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.”).
107 See
Fourth Amendment, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
108 Don
Samuel Garland, Search and Seizure–Inventory Searches–
Impoundment, CASETEXT (Sept. 1, 2015), https://casetext.com/analysis/search-andseizure-inventory-searches-impoundment.
109 See Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA
Collected for One Purpose is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1396
(2011).
110 N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 (1989); Ala. v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
111 See generally, JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FRIEDMAN’S
PRACTICE, (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 2009).
112 White, 496 U.S. at 330; State in the Int. of H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 251 (1977).
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In Baptiste v. State, 113 the court stated that reasonable
suspicion is a
less demanding standard than probable cause not
only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in
quantity or content than that required to establish
probable cause, but also in the sense that
reasonable suspicion can arise from information
that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.114
Stated differently, reasonable suspicion can be based upon a
lesser amount of information and less reliable information
compared to the higher standard required for probable cause.
This distinction between probable cause for a search versus
reasonable suspicion for a stop is oftentimes blurred. This is best
illustrated in the context of stop and frisks, pat-downs, and
vehicle stops. The Supreme Court made an important ruling on
the use of “stop-and-frisk” in the 1968 case, Terry v. Ohio, 115
hence such stops are referred to as Terry stops. Prior to Terry, a
police officer could not search arrested persons, unless the officer
obtained a search warrant. 116 A Terry stop permits a weapons
pat-down if there is reasonable suspicion that a person is armed
and dangerous. 117 This type of pat-down may also extend to a patdown of a vehicle’s passenger compartment if there is reasonable
suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous as the police
may open any container that may contain a weapon. 118 Police may
also require a driver to exit a vehicle, 119 order passengers out of a
113
114

at 251.

Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285, 291 (Fla. 2008).
Id.; see also Alabama, 496 U.S. at 330; State in the Int. of H.B., 75 N.J.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968).
See Jefferson v. State of Ark., 349 Ark. 236 (Ark. 2022); see also Probable
Cause Versus Reasonable Suspicion, MARICOPA COUNTY, https://www.maricopa.gov
/919/Probable-Cause-Versus-Reasonable-Suspici (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
117 Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047–48 (1983); Ariz. v. Johnson, 555 U.S.
323, 326–27 (2009).
118 Long, 463 U.S. at 1049.
119 See Pa. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (acknowledging that ordering a
115
116
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vehicle,120 and even require passengers to stay at a scene, 121 all
with the goal of maintaining officer safety.122 If officer safety is
asserted as the basis for the search, “the officer . . . must articulate
‘why’ officer safety was an issue (exactly what risk/danger to the
officer . . . existed). The officer must ‘explain’ why there was a
risk to the officer. . . . If the explanation is found to be
reasonable, the frisk is good.” 123
The Terry stop is already playing out in marijuana cases with
a New York court finding that the mere odor of marijuana
emanating from a pedestrian may not be enough to stop, frisk, or
search. 124 The Terry Court’s rationale was that reasonable
suspicion requires more evidence of criminal conduct to justify a
stop and detention. 125
The New York Police Department
(hereinafter “NYPD”) has adopted this position with a new policy
that was disseminated the day after the passage of the New York
recreational marijuana law. 126 How long a Terry detention may
last varies with the circumstances. 127
person out of their vehicle results in de minimis constitutional intrusion).
120 Md. v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (reasoning that after validly
stopping a car, an officer may order passengers as well as the driver out of the car—
“the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the
occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger”).
121 Brendlin v. Cal., 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007).
122 Basic Course Workbook Series , CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS
& TRAININGS (Sept. 2018), https://post.ca.gov/portals/0/post_docs/basic_course_
resources/workbooks/LD_22_V-3.2.pdf.
123 See Steven L. Argiriou, Terry Frisk Update: The Law, Field Examples and
Analysis , FED. L. ENF’T TRAINING CTR., at 1, https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files
/imported_files/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-andfaqs/research-by-subject/4th-amendment/terryfriskupdate.pdf.
124 People v. Brukner, 25 N.Y.S.3d 559, 571 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Dec. 31, 2015), aff’d ,
43 N.Y.S.3d 851 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Nov. 30, 2016).
125 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1986); see generally Illya D. Lichtenberg et.
al., Terry and Beyond: Testing the Underlying Assumption of Reasonable
Suspicion , 17 Touro L. Rev. 439 (March 2016).
126 Memorandum from Det. Smertiuk, New York Police Department, to all
Police Commands, Re: General Administrative Information (Mar. 31, 2021), at
https://nypost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/04/39319402msg.pdf
[hereinafter Smertiuk Memorandum]; Tina Moore et al., NYPD Gives Cops New
Orders to Let People Smoke Weed in Public , N.Y. POST (Apr. 1, 2021, 5:16 PM),
https://nypost.com/2021/04/01/nypd-gives-cops-new-orders-to-let-people-smokeweed-in-public/.
127 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). A more relaxed standard
has been applied to the detention of travelers at the border with the Court testing
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The issue of the odor of marijuana as the basis for a Terry
stop also arises with the use of sniff dogs. May an officer,
informed by his experience or the use of a sniff dog, conduct a
stop and frisk based upon the odor of marijuana? That was
precisely the issue in In re D.D. 128 where a Maryland appellate
court held that the odor of marijuana, by itself, does not provide
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore, a stop
based on this circumstance alone is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 129 The arresting officer in that case testified
that he could not differentiate the smell of marijuana, an illegal
substance, from the smell of hemp, a legal substance. 130 The
court reasoned that “because an officer cannot tell by the smell
of marijuana alone that a person is engaging in criminal activity,
we hold that the odor of marijuana, by itself, does not provide
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.” 131
Additionally, the Maryland General Assembly has decriminalized
possession of fewer than ten grams of marijuana. 132
Other courts have reached this same conclusion. In State v.
Francisco Perez,133 after the decriminalization of small amounts
of marijuana, the odor of marijuana remained a relevant factor in
assessing reasonable suspicion, but it did not alone provide
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 134 In Commonwealth v.
Cruz, 135 after the decriminalization of one ounce or less
of marijuana, the odor of marijuana alone did not provide

the reasonableness in terms of “the period of time necessary to either verify or
dispel the suspicion.” See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
544 (1985) (approving warrantless detention for more than 24 hours of traveler
suspected of alimentary canal drug smuggling). For a full discussion of the doctrine
of the Terry stop, see Terry Stop and Frisks: Doctrine and Practice, CONSTITUTION
ANNOTATED (last visited May 25, 2022) https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/
essay/amdt4_4_4_1_1/.
128 In re D.D., 250 A.3d 284, 286–87 (2021).

See id.
See Amber Stegall, Case Dismissed After 3,350 Pounds of Hemp in U-Haul
Mistaken for Marijuana, KCBD 11 (Jan. 2, 2020, 8:40 PM), https://www.kcbd.com/
129
130

2020/01/02/case-dismissed-after-pounds-hemp-u-haul-mistaken-marijuana/.
131 In re D.D., 250 A.3d at 295.
132 See Lewis v. State, 233 A.3d 86, 91 (2020).
133 State v. Perez, 239 A.3d 975, 985–86 (2020).
134 Id. at 984.
135 Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 908 (2011).
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reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 136
B. Homes & Curtilage
The expectation of privacy of the home has been found to be
sacrosanct.137 Protection of property interests as the basis of the
Fourth Amendment protection is rooted in early U.S. Supreme
Court cases 138 which found that a search or seizure within a home
or its curtilage, 139 without a warrant, was per se an unreasonable
search. 140 Whether an expectation is reasonable, depends upon:
(1)
whether
the
individual
exhibited
an
actual,
subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) whether the actual
expectation was one that society recognizes as reasonable.141 The
home privacy protection has ostensibly been extended in some
instances to offices, 142 apartments, 143 motel rooms, 144 rooms for
rent, 145 garages, 146 dorm rooms, 147 front porches,148 and even tents
136
137

See id.
See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mincey v. Ariz., 437

U.S. 385 (1978); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house;
he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge
that they cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitution.
That is still a sizable hunk of liberty—worth protecting from
encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide
some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some
insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a
man’s castle.
United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315–16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
138 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886); Adams v. N.Y., 192 U.S.
585, 598 (1904).
139 “At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate
activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life.’” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (citation omitted).
140 See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352–53 (1977)
(unanimous opinion); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Mich. v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978); Mincey v. Ariz., 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)
(unanimous opinion); Ark. v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 743, 758 (1979); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824–25 (1982).
141 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
142 S.D. v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); see also O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987).
143 People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 60–61 (1968).
144 See United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2004).
145 See State v. Fleming, 790 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 2010).
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as a home. 149 Essentially, anywhere that will be recognized as
private by society, even vehicles parked within the curtilage, are
protected and do not come within the automobile exception to a
warrant requirement. 150
At common law, curtilage is the area to which extends
“intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home
and the privacies of life.’” 151 The U.S. Supreme Court in Florida v.
Jardines 152 stated, “[w]e therefore regard the area ‘immediately
surrounding and associated with the home’—what our cases call
the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes.’” 153 In United States v. Dunn, 154 the Court stated that
curtilage questions should be resolved with
particular reference to four factors: the proximity
of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure
surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to
which the area is put, and the steps taken by the
resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by.155
The states differ on whether the search of a home or
curtilage, based upon the odor of marijuana alone, and, by virtue
of the experience of a law enforcement officer or a “sniff dog,” is
enough to establish probable cause to secure a warrant or to
conduct a warrantless search. 156 In State v. Kazmierczak, 157 the
146
147
148
149

See Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1010 (11th Cir. 2011).
See State v. Rodriguez, 529 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).
See State v. E.D.R., 959 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
See United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1993); LaDuke v. Nelson,

762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985); LaDuke v. Castillo, 455 F. Supp. 209 (E.D. Wash.
1978).
150 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018).
151 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
152 Fla. v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
153 Id. at 6 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
154 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
155 Id. at 301.
156 The scope of a search is another matter. See State v. Huff, 291 P.3d 751, 754
(Or. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming that the “current possession of a small amount of
illegal drugs in a person’s home does not give rise to probable cause to search the
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Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a search warrant that was
issued solely based upon the strong odor of marijuana that police
detected when they visited the home after receiving a complaint
that the residence was being used to manufacture marijuana. 158
In Johnson v. United States, 159 the U.S. Supreme Court found
that while the presence of odors was insufficient to authorize a
warrantless search, proper evidence of the presence of odors may
be sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant. 160 In
People v. Marshall, 161 the California Supreme Court ruled that
the smell of marijuana created probable cause to obtain a search
warrant for an apartment search but did not defend a warrantless
search. 162
In Florida v. Jardines,163 the Supreme Court found that law
enforcement officers’ use of a drug-sniffing dog on the front
porch of a home, to investigate an unverified tip
that marijuana was being grown in the home without a warrant,
was a trespassory invasion of the curtilage and constituted a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes.164 The Court made its
decision in spite of the fact that twenty-seven states and various
departments of the federal government, among others, had
supported Florida’s argument that such use of a police dog was
an acceptable form of minimally invasive warrantless search to
the home’s front porch. 165 Whether this U.S. Supreme Court
position will be bolstered by the fact that Florida, post-Jardines,
passed a medical marijuana law in 2016, 166 or if Florida does
indeed pass recreational marijuana in 2022 as purported,
remains to be seen.167
home for additional drugs”).
157 State v. Kazmierczak, 771 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
158 Id. at 478–79.
159 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
160 Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
161

Id.

People v. Marshall, 442 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal. 1968).
Fla. v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013).
164 Id. at 11–12.
165 Brief for Texas, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Fla. v.
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (No. 11-564).
166 FLA. STAT. § 381.986 (2021).
167 Understanding Marijuana Legislation: What is Legal and What’s Not?,
TURNING POINT OF TAMPA (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.tpoftampa.com
162
163
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Probable cause for a warrant to search a garage based upon
an anonymous tip that it contained a marijuana grow-house and
substantiated by law enforcement when they smelled the
marijuana emanating from the garage, was upheld by a
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Batista. 168
There, the defendant contended that “the smell of marijuana is
not indicative of criminal activity.
It is certainly not a
circumstance that would prompt a person of reasonable caution
to believe that a search of a private home should be conducted
without more.” 169 The defendant’s argument that marijuana was
decriminalized in Pennsylvania and that the state had passed a
medical marijuana law was not persuasive. 170 It is interesting to
speculate what the Pennsylvania Superior Court would have done
had the defendant argued that the officer could not tell the
difference between the odor of hemp and marijuana.
Pennsylvania is now considering the passage of a recreational
marijuana law making it legal for adults to possess small amounts
of marijuana. 171 Whether this potential change in Pennsylvania’s
marijuana law will be more persuasive in cases involving
marijuana searches in a garage based upon odor also remains to
be seen.
Many cases pre-date a state’s decriminalization or
legalization of marijuana and the federal legalization of hemp,
which can be grown commercially and privately in some states. 172
With these legal changes, the courts may overrule prior decisions.
Changes in the laws or statutes may also impact case law.

/understanding-marijuana-legislation/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
168 Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1207 (Pa. 2019).
169 Id. at 1202.
170

See id.

Anne Shannon, Pennsylvania Lawmakers Consider Bill to Legalize
Recreational Marijuana, WGAL 8 (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.wgal.com
171

/article/pennsylvania-lawmakers-bill-legalize-recreational-marijuana/37769691.
172 See Herbert Fuego, Ask A Stoner: Can I Grow Hemp at Home Now?,
WESTWORD (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.westword.com/marijuana/farming-hemp-islegal-now-but-what-about-growing-at-home-11111741.
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In United States v. Jones,173 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a conviction for a variety of charges, including
marijuana possession.174 The officers smelled the odor of
marijuana at Jones’ house and then observed a marijuana
cigarette. 175 The officers obtained a warrant to search the house
for evidence of marijuana because simple possession of marijuana
was a crime in Virginia. 176 Jones was arrested and indicted for,
among other charges, marijuana possession.177 Both the search
itself and the scope of the search were issues in the case. 178
Since that time, in July 2021, Virginia repealed the simple
possession of marijuana statute that it used to convict Jones. 179
Given the repeal of that statute, would probable cause based
upon the odor of marijuana, which led to the observation of the
marijuana cigarette, suffice to execute a warrant in this case? If
so, would this same court uphold that warrant, or would the court
believe that the odor would not be indicative of whether the
marijuana possession was simple and therefore legal, or was it an
illegal amount? What about the fact that now-legal hemp smells
like marijuana? Could this fact also affect the execution of the
warrant? These same types of issues are arising in the context of
exceptions to the warrant requirement, as will be discussed below.
Irrespective of whether a state has decriminalized or
legalized marijuana, law enforcement may still not be able to
conduct a warrantless search of a home or its curtilage because
someone is in possession of marijuana. In State v. Markus, 180 a
police officer observed the defendant smoking a marijuana
United States v. Jones, 952 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
1080 (2021).
174 Id. at 160.
175 Id. at 155.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 157.
178 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Jones, 952 F.3d 153
(2020) (No. 20-5285) In the Petition for Certiorari, which was denied by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the defense pointed out that “[i]f Mr. Jones had lived in one of the
states in the Sixth, Ninth, or Tenth Circuit, or one of the states agreeing with those
courts, the police would have needed more than a mere sniff of marijuana at his
front door in order to have probable cause to search his entire house, including a
locked safe in his bedroom that could not have contained burning marijuana.” Id.
179 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250.1 (repealed 2021).
180 State v. Markus, 211 So. 3d 894, 897–98 (Fla. 2017).
173
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cigarette outside and, when the police approached him, the
defendant threw it to the ground and backed into his open
garage. 181 This resulted in a warrantless search of the garage. 182
The Florida Supreme Court stated that the underlying crime of
marijuana possession was a nonviolent misdemeanor and unless
the search rose to the level of an exigent circumstance, which it
did not, the search should not be upheld. 183 Interestingly, Florida
had no decriminalization or legalization of marijuana at the time.
C. Land as Curtilage
In Florida v. Jardines, 184 Justice Scalia cited a variety of
pertinent U.S. Supreme Court cases and addressed the extent of
curtilage as follows:
We therefore regard the area “immediately
surrounding and associated with the home”—what
our cases call the curtilage—as “part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” That
principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as the
distinction between the home and the open fields is
“as old as the common law,” so too is the identity of
home and what Blackstone called the “curtilage or
homestall,” for the “house protects and privileges
all its branches and appurtenants.” This area
around the home is “intimately linked to the home,
both physically and psychologically,” and is where
“privacy expectations are most heightened.” 185
Despite this extensive interpretation of curtilage, ascertaining the
boundaries of curtilage is not a simple concept and is mostly
dependent on how and where the search is conducted. Courts
seem willing to find areas to be outside of the curtilage if they are
in any way separate from the home. 186 For example, the land
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id.
Id. at 898.
Id. at 912.

Fla v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013).
Id. at 6–7 (citations omitted).
United States v. Hatch, 931 F.2d 1478, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991).
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surrounding a home may be characterized as curtilage and
therefore be subject to constitutional protection against
warrantless searches.187 Whether a court wants to extend the
protection on the issue of marijuana grows on land without a
warrant varies from court to court.
Although backyards have been deemed curtilage, long
before any marijuana laws were enacted and as far back as 1986
in California v. Ciraolo, 188 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
warrantless aerial observation of a fenced-in backyard within the
curtilage of a home was not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 189 In Ciraolo, the police based their observation
upon an anonymous tip that a person was growing marijuana on
their land. 190 The Court stated that Ciraolo’s expectation of
privacy
“from all observations
of
his
backyard”
was
191
unreasonable.
The Court reasoned that the yard and its crop
being within the “curtilage” of Ciraolo’s home did not, itself, “bar
all police observation.” 192 In fact, “[a]ny member of the public
flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that [the] officers observed.” 193
In State v. Davis,194 the state police “received several reports
that residents were growing marijuana plants” and conducted
aerial surveillance of the defendant’s greenhouse with a lowflying helicopter.195 The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that
the aerial surveillance was an unconstitutional search requiring a
warrant. 196 Although the U.S. Supreme Court found that an
aerial observation of marijuana grow did not constitute a search
187

Id. at 1481.

Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
See Hoffman v. People, 780 P.2d 471, 475 (Colo. 1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
at 215; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). But see Lacey v. State, 931
N.E.2d 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). See also Jon Delano, On 4/20, Pennsylvania
moves closer to legalizing adult recreational cannabis, CBS PITTSBURGH (Apr. 20,
2022),
https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/pennsylvania-moves-closerlegalizing-adult-recreational-cannabis/.
190 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
191 Id. at 211–12, 213–14.
192 Id. at 213.
193 Id. at 213–14.
194 State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161 (N.M. 2015).
195 Id. at 1163.
196 Id. at 1173.
188
189
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in Ciraolo, fifteen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed
the use of infrared heat technology to detect marijuana grow in a
home without a warrant was a search. 197 In Kyllo v. United
States, 198 the Court stated, that “where . . . the Government uses a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a
private home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a [Fourth
Amendment] ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without
a warrant.” 199
Thus, the home and curtilage constitutional protections have
two nuances: like some other constitutional protections, a state
may grant more protections than what is granted under the
federal Constitution, 200 and while a warrantless search of a home
and curtilage is presumed unreasonable, there are a few
exceptions.201

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id.
199 Id. at 40.
200 Timothy Sandefur, The First Line of Defense: Litigation for Liberty at the
State Level, GOLDWATER INST. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/first197
198

line-of-defense/ (“The federal Constitution creates a basic minimum of legal
security for rights such as free speech, due process, and security against searches
and seizures—a ‘floor’ below which the states may not fall. But states can provide
increased protections, and most states do just that, at least on paper.”); see also

State Constitutions in the Federal System: Selected Issues and Opportunities for
State Initiatives, ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS. 79–81 (July

1989), https://library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/policy/a-113.pdf.
201 See Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“The seizure of property in
plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable,
assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity.”); Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (“In each case, this initial
intrusion is justified by a warrant or by an exception such as ‘hot pursuit’ or search
incident to a lawful arrest, or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer’s
presence.”); Smallwood v. State, 113 So.3d 724, 731 (Fla. 2013) (discussing the
search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement); Riggs v. State, 918 So.2d 274, 278 (Fla. 2005) (“When the
government invokes [the exigent circumstances exception] to support the
warrantless entry of a home, it must rebut the presumption that such entries are
unreasonable.”).
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D. Exigent Circumstances Exception
The exigent circumstances exception applies when “‘the
exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” 202 The burden is on the state to
demonstrate that an exigent circumstance existed to justify the
warrantless search. 203 Exigent circumstances require that there be
a “‘grave emergency’ that ‘makes a warrantless search imperative
to the safety of the police and of the community.’” 204 The U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently recognized three major
categories of exigent circumstances: (1) the emergency aid
exception, whereby an officer enters a home to render
emergency assistance to an occupant who is seriously injured or
to whom serious injury is imminent; (2) “to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence;” and (3) the hot pursuit exception, which
allows officers to proceed into a residence without a warrant if
they are in the process of the continuous hot pursuit of a fleeing
suspect. 205 As is true for any protected right against a warrantless
search, if there is an exigent circumstance, the revered home and
its curtilage protection could be lost.

Mincey v. Ariz., 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
See Riggs, 918 So.2d at 278–79. To carry that burden, the State must show
an existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances to validate the
warrantless entry. Welsh v. Wis., 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984).
204 Riggs, 918 So.2d at 278–79 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Ill. v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 191 (1990)).
205 Ky. v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (citations omitted)
This Court has identified several exigencies that may justify a
warrantless search of a home. Under the “emergency aid”
exception, for example, “officers may enter a home without a
warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or
to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Police officers may
enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of
a fleeing suspect. And—what is relevant here—the need “to
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence” has long been
recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search.;
see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Holder v. State, 847
N.E.2d 930, 936–37 (Ind. 2006); Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. at 590 (1980) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent
exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
warrant.”).
202
203
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E. “Open Fields”
The “open fields” doctrine was first recognized in 1924 in

Hester v. United States, 206 where the Supreme Court held that

the Fourth Amendment “did not protect ‘open fields’ and that,
therefore, police searches in such areas as pastures, wooded
areas, open water, and vacant lots need not comply with the
requirements of warrants and probable cause.” 207 In Oliver v.
United States, 208 the Supreme Court held that a search of open
fields is not considered a Fourth Amendment search, and thus, it
is not governed by the Fourth Amendment. 209 There, narcotics
agents investigated Oliver’s farm based on reports that marijuana
was being grown on Oliver’s farm.210 Upon arrival at the farm,
the agents drove past Oliver’s house to a locked gate with a “No
Trespassing” sign, but with a footpath around one side.211 The
agents then “walked around the gate and along the road” and
found a marijuana field over a mile from Oliver’s house. 212 Oliver
was arrested and indicted for manufacturing a “controlled
substance” in violation of a federal statute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). 213
The Oliver majority held that, even for secluded lands and
notwithstanding efforts of the owner to exclude the public by
erecting fences or posting “No Trespassing” signs, a warrantless
search was not constitutionally protected. 214 The Court reasoned
that society does not recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in open fields because they “do not provide the setting
for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to
shelter from government interference or surveillance.” 215

206 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see also Air Pollution
Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (stating that the
“open fields” exception was approved in Hester).
207 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 61, at 11971269 (citing Hester, 265 U.S. at 59).
208 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
209 Id. at 180–81.
210 Id. at 173.
211
212
213
214
215

Id.
Id.
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
Id. at 182–84.
Id. at 179.
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Since Oliver, the highest courts of Montana, New
York, Oregon, and Vermont, as well as a Washington state
appeals court, have rejected the open fields doctrine and
protected the privacy rights of their citizens based upon their
state constitutions, and in some instances, the steps taken by the
defendant to protect their privacy interest. 216
In State v. Dixson, 217 after flying over the property in
question and observing groves of the plant, based upon a tip, the
police were able to see cannabis planted outside the curtilage of
the house. 218 The defendant’s conviction of manufacturing and
possessing a controlled substance was upheld. 219 The Supreme
Court of Oregon held that: (1) there is no open field exception to
the search and seizure provision of the Oregon Constitution; but
(2) an individual’s privacy interest in land which she or he has left
unimproved and unbounded is not sufficient to trigger the
protections of the constitutional provisions,: and (3) officers
could make a warrantless entry into an open field which was only
posted with a “No Hunting” sign. 220
In People v. Scott, 221 law enforcement officers executed a
search warrant on property based on the use of “in-camera”
testimony of a private citizen who observed what appeared to be
the remnants of a marijuana growing operation. 222
The
defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree possession of
marijuana. 223 The question presented on the appeal was whether
defendant’s act of posting “No Trespassing” signs about every
twenty to thirty feet around the perimeter of his property where
he was growing marijuana, established an expectation of privacy
cognizable under the right to privacy protection of the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, section 12 of

216 State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328
(N.Y. 1992); State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015 (Or. 2005); State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d
988 (Vt. 1991); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
217 State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015 (Or. 2005).
218 Id. at 1016.
219 Id. at 1024.
220 See id. at 1024.
221 People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).
222 Id. at 1330.
223 See id. at 1331.
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the New York Constitution. 224
The court ruled that the
warrantless entries of the police and the trespasser were illegal
under the N.Y. Constitution. 225 The court reasoned that because
Scott’s property was posted with “No Trespassing” signs, Scott
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. 226
The Vermont Supreme Court, after an extensive discussion
of the open field doctrine, took a similar posture to New York. 227
The court provided the only issue on appeal of a conviction for
cultivating marijuana was the legality under the Vermont
Constitution of a warrantless search of defendant’s property. 228
The court held that this search violated Chapter I, Article 11, of
the Vermont Constitution, and reversed. 229 Based on a tip,
officers flew over a property and took photographs. 230
The Vermont Supreme Court stated “[b]y no stretch of the
imagination could the officers reasonably conclude . . . that their
‘walk-on’ search was permissible.” 231
Indeed, “[g]iven the
extensive posting of the land, defendant’s intent to exclude the
public was unequivocal.” 232 As such, the court found that the
“officers’ walk over defendant’s logging roads and through his
woods violated his right to privacy under Article 11 [of the
Vermont Constitution], and the evidence obtained thereby may
not be used against him.” 233
It is interesting to note that these series of cases were
decided well before the passage of any marijuana laws. Each
court will continue to determine whether they will follow the U.S.
Supreme Court “open field” doctrine as decided in Oliver or look to
their own state Fourth Amendment constitutional protection. 234
Those states that do not follow the Oliver doctrine will look to
whether the facts of the case establish an expectation of privacy
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

See id. at 1341.
Id. at 1338.

State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015, 1338 (Or. 2005).
See State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1991).

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 14.
Kirchoff, 156 Vt. At 14.
Id.

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
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consistent with the analysis set forth in Katz, where the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment permits the
police to conduct a warrantless search of an area in which a
person does not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 235 In
the meantime, the presence of illegal commercial hemp grows:
growers without state permission under a hemp program, along
with the perceived odor of marijuana, may play a role in
conducting warrantless searches in “open fields.” 236 The 2018
Farm Bill permits the USDA to approve plans submitted by states
and native American tribes for the domestic production of
hemp.237 It further establishes a federal plan that the USDA
directly manages for producers in states or territories of native
American tribes that do not have a USDA-approved plan but the
production of hemp is legal. 238 In fact, searches in open fields for
hemp may even increase. Despite the fact that recreational
marijuana is legal in sixteen states and more accessible now than
ever before, illegal grows continue. 239 In California for example,
“as more licenses to grow marijuana are added, illegal growing has
also risen” with more than 1.11 million illegal plants seized in 2020.240
F. Plain Sight/View & Plain Smell Doctrines
Unlike the “open fields doctrine,” the plain sight/view and
plain smell doctrines are very much impacted by the
decriminalization and legalization of marijuana and hemp. 241
The smell and look of illegal marijuana and legal hemp are
almost indistinguishable, which is making identification for law

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Hemp and Farm Programs, USDA, https://www.farmers.gov/yourbusiness/row-crops/hemp (last visited May 25, 2022).
237 Hemp Production Questions and Answers, USDA, https://www.ams.usda.gov/
rules-regulations/hemp/questions-and-answers (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
235
236

238
239

Id.
Id.

240 Kurt Snibbe, As More Licenses to Grow Marijuana are Added, Illegal
Growing Has Also Risen in California, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2021, 9:21 PM),

https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/08/11/as-more-licenses-to-grow-cannabis-areadded-illegal-growing-has-also-risen-in-california/.
241 Matt Shipman, Is Hemp the Same Thing As Marijuana?, NC STATE UNIV.
(Feb.
14,
2019),
https://news.ncsu.edu/2019/02/is-hemp-the-same-thing-asmarijuana/.
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enforcement and their “sniff dogs” difficult. 242 While hemp
remained illegal under the CSA, law enforcement officers and
their “sniff dogs” did not have to distinguish between hemp and
marijuana visually or olfactorily, as they are now being called
upon to do. These similarities are compounded by the fact that
many locales and states have either decriminalized marijuana 243
or outright made it available statewide through the passage of
medical and recreational marijuana laws. 244
The “plain sight” or “plain view” doctrine was first
recognized in 1971 in the U.S. Supreme Court case Coolidge v.
New Hampshire.245 Although a car was seized in Coolidge instead
of marijuana plants, and, the officers intended to seize the car
when they entered on petitioner’s property, the Court found that
the “plain view” doctrine was inapplicable.246 The Court stated
that “where the police had ample opportunity to obtain a
valid warrant, knew in advance the car’s description and
location . . . and no contraband or dangerous objects were
involved, the exception was inapplicable.” 247
The Court characterized “plain view” as an exception to a
warrant requirement. 248 The Coolidge plurality set forth three
requirements necessary to uphold the warrantless seizure by
police of private possessions based on “plain view.” 249
First, the police officer must lawfully make an
“initial intrusion” or otherwise properly be in a
position from which he can view a particular
area.
Second, the officer must discover
incriminating evidence “inadvertently,” which is to
say, he may not “know in advance the location of
[certain] evidence and intend to seize it,” relying
on the plain view doctrine only as a
JOHNSON, supra note 28.
See generally Hartman, supra note 55.
244 See State Medical Cannabis Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATES LEGIS. (Feb. 3,
2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.
245 Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971).
246 Id. at 472.
247 Id. at 444.
248 Id. at 464.
249 Id. at 467–68.
242
243
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pretext. Finally, it must be “immediately
apparent” to the police that the items they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure. While the lower courts
generally have applied the Coolidge plurality’s
discussion of “plain view,” it has never been
expressly adopted by a majority of [the U.S.
Supreme Court]. 250
In Texas v. Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court further stated
that “‘plain view’ is perhaps better understood . . . not as an
independent ‘exception’ to the warrant clause, but simply as an
extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s
‘access to an object’ may be.” 251
In Brown, the Court
distinguished “plain view” from “plain sight.” 252 The Court noted
that the term “plain view” as used to justify seizure of an object
must be distinguished “from an officer’s mere observation of an
item left in plain view.” 253 The latter “generally involves no
Fourth Amendment search . . . [but] the former generally does
implicate the [Fourth] Amendment’s limitations upon seizures of
personal property.” 254 The Court further noted that “information
obtained as a result of observation of an object in plain sight may
be the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion of illegal
activity,” and “these levels of suspicion may, in some cases . . .
justify police conduct affording them access to a particular
item.” 255 Stated another way, the seizure of property in plain view
is permissible without a warrant if there is probable cause to
believe that the property observed is somehow involved in
criminal activity or is illegal contraband. 256

250 Tex. v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465–
68, 470); See Howard E. Wallin, The Uncertain Scope of the Plain View Doctrine,
16 U. OF BALT. L. REV. 266 (1987).
251 Brown, 460 U.S. at 738–39.
252 Id. at 738 n.4.
253
254
255
256

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Plain View: Annotations, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/constitution/

us/amendment-04/21-plain-view.html#tc-345, at n.345 (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
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With respect to the “plain view” doctrine, the
decriminalization and legalization of recreational and medical
marijuana and hemp calls into question whether an officer who is
lawfully present at a location and views what is believed to be
illegal marijuana is in fact viewing illegal marijuana. If marijuana
has been legalized, is what is being viewed incriminating evidence
of a marijuana crime or illegal contraband? Many marijuana laws
permit adults to grow a certain amount of marijuana plants in
their abode and outdoors in a secure manner. 257 Prior to
marijuana legalization in any form, it was clear that an officer did
not have to face the issue of the legality of marijuana.
After Pennsylvania passed a medical marijuana law in 2016
and decriminalized small amounts of marijuana possession in
several counties, a Pennsylvania court, in Commonwealth v.
Rial, 258 upheld a trooper’s warrantless intrusion into the
defendant’s yard and subsequent seizure of marijuana plants
based on the trooper’s plain view of the defendant’s marijuana
plants. 259 The plain view was based upon the trooper’s training
and experience as immediately identifying the plants as
marijuana. 260 Rhetorically speaking, could the defendant have
257

or

See Susan Gunelius, Which States Allow You to Grow Your Own Recreational
Medical
Cannabis?,
CANNABIZ
MEDIA
(Sept.
8,
2020),

https://www.cannabiz.media/blog/which-states-allow-you-to-grow-your-ownrecreational-or-medical-cannabis (stating that “of the 34 states that have legalized
medical and/or adult-use cannabis, more than half of them . . . allow some form of
at-home cannabis growing.”); Meghan Matt, Cannabis Law & Policy: In the Age of

Decriminalization, Is the Odor of Marijuana Alone Enough to Justify a Warrantless
Search? 47 S.U. L. REV. 459 (2020); Amber Taufen, Colorado Cannabis Laws,
WESTWORD, https://www.westword.com/marijuana/laws (last visited Jan. 4, 2022); see
also Know the Law, WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD, https://lcb.wa.gov/mjeducation/know-the-law (last visited Jan. 4, 2022); Frequently Asked Questions: Can
I Smoke or Consume Adult-Use Marijuana Products in Public?, CANNABIS CONTROL

COMMISSION, https://masscannabiscontrol.com/frequently-asked-questions/#general
(last visited Jan. 4, 2022).
258 Commonwealth v. Rial, No. 891 WDA, 2021 WL 3163154 (Pa. Super. Ct.
July 27, 2021).
259 See Max Cherney, Philadelphia Is Decriminalizing Marijuana Possession,
VICE NEWS (Sept. 14, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/yw44q5
/philadelphia-is-decriminalizing-marijuana-possession; see also Laila Kearney,
Pittsburgh to Decriminalize Small Amounts of Marijuana, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2015,
2:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/pennsylvania-marijuana/pittsburgh-todecriminalize-small-amounts-of-marijuana-idUSL1N14A28P20151221.
260 Rial, 2021 WL 3163154 at *4.
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inquired at trial if the trooper could accurately distinguish
between the look and smell of marijuana and hemp? If the
plants were in a secure location in the defendant’s yard, would it
be reasonable for the trooper to conclude that the plants were
being illegally grown? If there was any question about whether
the marijuana grown was more than the permissible amount
under a state recreational or medical marijuana law, should the
trooper have secured a warrant?
While the “plain view” and “open fields” doctrine have
enjoyed a long-standing exception to the warrant requirement,
the “plain smell” doctrine has a more limited status, as some
states uphold it as the basis for probable cause, while others do
not. 261 In Johnson v. United States, 262 the United States Supreme
Court did address the “smell” of opium along with other factors
that resulted in entry into a house and ultimately a room
therein.263 The search and subsequent arrest were not upheld for
a variety of reasons, none of which were related to the “smell” of
opium.264 There is still no final word on this doctrine from the
U.S. Supreme Court, but without acknowledging its validity, the
Court did briefly discuss the “smell” of marijuana as it related to
the case in the Florida v. Jardines concurring opinion. 265 Despite
the Supreme Court’s failure to adopt “plain smell,” the lower
federal courts embrace it overwhelmingly 266 and the states have

261

United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 494 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1974);

see also United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974).

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Id. at 12–13.
264 Id. at 16.
265 Fla v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2013) (concurrence) (discussing whether
using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of the
home constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see
also, Olivia Khazam, It’s Right Under Your Nose! The Trial of the Senses and the
“Plain Smell” Doctrine, CTR. FOR SENSORY STUDS. (Apr. 23, 2014),
https://centreforsensorystudies.org/occasional-papers/its-right-under-your-nose-thetrial-of-the-senses-and-the-plain-smell-doctrine/ (noting that in United States v.
Johns, Justice O’Connor of the U.S. Supreme Court did mention by dicta the plain
smell doctrine, and referred to United States v. Haley, “in which the Fourth Circuit
held that ‘plain smell’ may justify a warrantless search of a container.”).
266 Michael A. Sprow, Wake Up and Smell the Contraband: Why Courts that Do
Not Find Probable Cause Based on Odor Alone Are Wrong, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
289, 295 (2000).
262
263
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also addressed the doctrine with varying outcomes.267
Sometimes these doctrines overlap with the exigent
circumstance’s exception. For example, law enforcement may
identify marijuana through “plain sight” and “plain smell” in a
home where a child resides and is exposed to the marijuana.
Does that scenario establish an exigent circumstance that would
obviate the need to secure a warrant? After a state decriminalizes
and legalizes marijuana, it may not be enough to conduct an
emergency search of the home without a warrant for several
reasons. In Holder v. State, 268 the Indiana Supreme Court held
that police officers’ detection of a “very strong odor of ether”
near a residence provided sufficient exigent circumstances for
them to enter the apparent curtilage of the dwelling without a
warrant to confirm that the smell was, in fact, emanating from it
and then, upon learning that a young child was inside the house,
entering to bring her outside. 269 Nevertheless, with respect to
potential child endangerment, where marijuana is legally used or
grown in a home in front of a child, the trend seems to be that
there needs to be evidence that the use or grow is detrimental to
the child in some regard. 270
Further, growing and using
marijuana in one’s home may be legal in those states that have
passed medical and recreational marijuana laws that permit
adult-use and grow of marijuana plants within the confines of a
home.271

Id. at 291 n.17, 296 n.41 (noting that the “majority of courts addressing
plain smell have adopted it”).
268 Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 934, 938 (Ind. 2006).
267

269
270

Id.
See, e.g., In re Drake M., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); In re

Alexis E., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); In re J.A., 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 915
(Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
271 Can
You
Grow
Hemp
at
Home?,
FORTUNA
HEMP,
https://fortunahemp.com/can-you-grow-hemp-at-home/# (last visited May 25, 2022)
Arizona, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and Washington State only allow medical marijuana
cultivation. . . . Alaska, Colorado, Maine, and Massachusetts allow
residents to grow their own cannabis—whether it’s hemp or
marijuana is moot . . . “California, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon,
and Vermont” allow medical patients higher plant counts
compared to their recreational neighbors.

CELESTE (DO NOT DELETE)

528

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

9/15/2022 9:05 PM

[Vol. 46:3

These “plain smell” and “plain view” doctrines have also
been examined in conjunction with the “automobile exception”
and the “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant
requirement. 272 In the cases preceding the decriminalization and
legalization of marijuana and hemp, the odor of marijuana as
illegal contraband mostly gave rise to probable cause to conduct a
search under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. 273
Additionally, several appellate courts had
expanded the search to the trunk and other areas of the vehicle
based on the odor of marijuana. 274 Post-state decriminalization
and legalization of recreational or medical marijuana, appellate
cases are addressing whether the odor of marijuana may form the
basis of a warrantless search of a vehicle, including its occupants.
The developing appellate case law in this area is meeting with
mixed outcomes.
G. Automobile Exception
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement was
first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United
States. 275 Chief Justice Taft stated that there was a lower standard
of reasonableness for searching an automobile than for other
places since, due to its mobility, the automobile might be gone by
272
273

See United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
See United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1982); see also United

States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1986); State v. Walker, 974 N.E.2d
1213 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
274 See United States v. Winters, 221 F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming
the lower court’s conclusion that “once the trooper smelled marijuana, he had
probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including the trunk and all containers
therein, for controlled substances”); United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that evidence of personal use amounts of marijuana “was
sufficient to establish a ‘fair probability’ that Turner might have hidden additional
drugs not necessary for his current consumption in areas out of plain sight,
including the trunk of the car”); United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686–87
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding that “the smell of marihuana [in the passenger area] alone
may be ground enough for a finding of probable cause” to search other areas of the
vehicle).
275 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see Pa. v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 109 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); S.D. v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)
(plurality opinion); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973)(all indicating
the lesser protection afforded to automobiles).
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the time a search warrant could be obtained. 276 Since that
decision, the reasons for the vehicle exception have become twofold. “Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant
requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with
respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating
to one’s home or office.” 277 Since mobile homes are a hybrid of
automobiles and more traditional homes or offices, their Fourth
Amendment protection is circumstance-driven. 278 In this totality
of the facts analysis, courts have considered whether the motor
home is on wheels and traveling, 279 or whether the mobile home
is stationary or on stilts. 280 “If the motor home were parked in
the exact middle of the intersection between the general rule and
the exception for automobiles, priority should be given to the
rule rather than [to] the exception.” 281
The Carroll Court further stated that the search must be
based upon probable cause, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains such
contraband. 282 The search, however, “extends no further than the
automobile itself.” 283 Carroll was decided in 1925 during alcohol
prohibition, thus the contraband addressed in that case was
alcohol. 284 Marijuana has been considered and treated as illegal
contraband at least since the Marijuana Tax Act, 285 during the
1930s when several states started to make possession of
marijuana illegal, and with the passage of the Controlled
Substance Act (“CSA”). 286
Whether it still maintains that
characterization is one of the preeminent questions arising in the
courts, that is, whether marijuana after decriminalization or the
276
277
278
279
280
281
282

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–55.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367.
See Powell v. State, 120 So. 3d 577, 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
See United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 1998).
See Cal. v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
Id. at 402.
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.

Collins v. Va., 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018).
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 24–27 (2005).
285 See United States v. Leazar, 460 F.2d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 1972).
286 See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT (CSA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 117TH CONGRESS 2 (2021),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45948.pdf.
283
284
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passage of recreational or medical marijuana laws, is still illegal
contraband.
The courts have also addressed whether, if
marijuana is not considered illegal contraband, may the odor
alone permit a warrantless search of a vehicle or person
therein.287
Courts weigh the “plain smell” doctrine heavily when
discussing the automobile exception as it relates to marijuana
odor. 288 As early as 1948, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the odor of an illegal drug can be probative in establishing
probable cause for a search without a warrant. 289 In Johnson v.
United States, 290 the Supreme Court explained:
[i]f the presence of odors is testified to before a
magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to
know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive
to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has
never held such a basis insufficient to justify
issuance of a search warrant. Indeed, it might very
well be found to be evidence of most persuasive
character. 291
A Pennsylvania Superior Court further wrestled with these
issues in Commonwealth v. Barr, 292 where the court found that
the odor of marijuana does not per se establish probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle “because a substantial
See United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that
odor of marijuana established probable cause for a search); United States v. Pond,
523 F.2d 210, 211 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that informant’s detection of odor of
marijuana was sufficient to provide probable cause for issuance of a search
warrant); United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 470–71 (3d Cir. 1973) (validating a
search of a suitcase based solely on officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana).
288 Rivera, 595 F.2d at 1099; Pond, 523 F.2d at 211 (both finding detection of
odor in the vehicle established probable cause for a search).
289 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
290 Id. at 10.
291 Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
292 Commonwealth v. Barr, 240 A.3d 1263, 1269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020), vacated,
266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021) (vacating superior court’s decision and remanding decision
holding that while the court was in agreement with the superior court about the law
as stated in the article, the superior court did not sufficiently consider a specific
factor in its analysis).
287
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number of Pennsylvania citizens can now consume marijuana
legally, calling into question the so-called plain smell doctrine.” 293
The defendant in Barr argued that the U.S. Supreme Court in
Johnson did not articulate a per se rule regarding the odor of
obvious contraband. 294 Instead, Justice Jackson clearly expressed
that the odor of a “forbidden” substance is a factor that “might”
constitute evidence of the “most persuasive character” when
considered in the totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable
cause. 295
The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed that there is no
preexisting per se rule that the odor of marijuana
is always sufficient to establish probable cause to believe a crime is
being committed. 296 The court referred to language in the
Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act to show that compliance
with the Act will not constitute a crime under the CSA.297 It is
important to note that the defendant in Barr presented the
officers with his medical marijuana card prior to the search at
issue.298 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further taken
these matters up on review and phrased the issues as: (1) what
weight, if any, should the odor of marijuana be given in
determining whether probable cause exists for a warrantless
vehicle search, in light of the enactment of the Medical
Marijuana Act, and (2) to what extent does this court’s decision
in Commonwealth v. Hicks apply to probable cause
determinations involving the possession of marijuana following
the enactment of the Medical Marijuana Act. 299
In 2014, Maryland passed a medical marijuana law and
decriminalized possession of fewer than ten grams of
marijuana. 300 In Pacheco v. State, 301 the Maryland Court of
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300

Id. at 1268–69.
Id. at 1274–75.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id. at 1278.
See Commonwealth v. Barr, 240 A.3d 1263, 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020).
See id.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 5-601 and 5-601.1; see also Maryland,

WEEDMAPS, https://weedmaps.com/learn/laws-and-regulations/maryland (last visited
May 25, 2022)
Maryland’s HB 881, the Natalie M. LaPrade Medical Marijuana
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Appeals held that law enforcement, who detected marijuana odor
emanating from a vehicle and observed a marijuana “joint” in the
vehicle console, had probable cause to search that vehicle under
the automobile exception to warrant requirement. 302 The search
of the defendant was unreasonable because the possession of a
“joint” and the odor of marijuana did not give the officers
probable cause to believe the defendant was in possession of a
criminal amount of marijuana. 303 The court stated that “the facts
presented by the State and credited by the hearing judge were
sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle based
on the presence of contraband.” 304 The court went on to reason
that “little else was presented that addressed why this minimal
amount of marijuana, which is not a misdemeanor, but rather a
civil offense, gave rise to a fair probability that [defendant]
possessed a criminal amount of marijuana on his person.” 305
The following year, in Lewis v. State, 306 an officer approached
a defendant and smelled an odor of marijuana emitting from
him, stopped the defendant based on the odor of marijuana and
the information that he received, and searched him. 307 The court
held “that the odor of marijuana, if localized to a particular
person, provides probable cause to arrest that person for the
crime of possession of marijuana.” 308 The court found when the
officer smelled the odor of marijuana from appellant’s person
and localized to appellant, the officer had probable cause to
arrest appellant and search him incident to that arrest. 309 The
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded
the case and held that the odor of marijuana, without more, does

301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309

Commission legislation, was signed by Gov. Martin O’Malley in
2014. HB 881 created the Natalie M. LaPrade Maryland Medical
Cannabis Commission (MMCC) and charged it with establishing
regulations for the legal consumption, cultivation, possession,
and distribution of cannabis products to patients 18 and older.
Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 508 (Md. 2019).
Id. at 517–18.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 518.

Lewis v. State, 237 Md. App. 661 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018).

See id.
See id.
Id. at 669.
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not provide law enforcement officers with the requisite probable
cause to arrest and perform a warrantless search of that person
incident to the arrest.310 The court went on to hold that the odor
of marijuana
is not indicative of the quantity, if any, of
marijuana in someone’s possession for purposes of
search incident to arrest exception to warrant
requirement . . . arresting and searching a person,
without a warrant and based exclusively on the
odor of marijuana on that person’s body or breath,
is unreasonable; and odor of marijuana emanating
from defendant’s person fell short of supplying the
requisite probable cause to conduct search incident
to arrest. 311
In Butler v. United States, 312 the court noted that prior to the
legalization of marijuana in Washington D.C., “the smell of
marijuana generally emanating from appellant’s vehicle . . .
indisputably would allow the police to search the vehicle,” but the
court had “reservations” about whether the driver’s arrest could
have been upheld without the additional facts that the defendant
was engaged in criminal activity. 313 After the decriminalization of
marijuana in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the odor of
marijuana remains a relevant factor in assessing reasonable
suspicion, but it does not alone provide reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. 314

310

Id.

Lewis v. State, 233 A.3d 86, 86 (Md. 2020).
Butler v. United States, 102 A.3d 736, 741 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
313 Id. at 739.
314 State v. Perez, 239 A.3d 975, 985–86 (N.H. 2020) (decided after
decriminalization of small amounts of marijuana); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945
N.E.2d 899, 908 (Mass. 2011) (decided after the decriminalization of one ounce or
less of marijuana and reasoning that the odor of marijuana alone does not provide
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
311
312
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In State v. Seckinger, 315 the Nebraska Supreme Court also
addressed the issue of whether the odor of marijuana, standing
alone, furnished probable cause to support the warrantless search
of defendant’s vehicle.316 There, the defendant argued that
Nebraska had decriminalized possession of small amounts of
marijuana and that the neighboring state of Colorado had
legalized recreational marijuana. 317 The defendant’s primary
contention was that the legalization of marijuana in Colorado
eroded the legal premise of the court’s precedent because the
odor of marijuana standing alone no longer suggests criminal
activity. 318 The court upheld that the odor of marijuana coming
from a vehicle, standing alone, still provided probable cause to
search the vehicle.319
In 2019, in People v. Shumake, 320 after California legalized
recreational marijuana, an officer lawfully stopped a vehicle, and
based upon the odor of marijuana and the defendant admitting
to possessing marijuana, which he handed to the officer from the
console, he established “more probable cause to believe there was
more marijuana in the vehicle” and thus, the officer conducted a
full search of the vehicle. 321 The court concluded that, given the
legality of the personal use of marijuana in the State of
California, there was not a fair probability that the officer would
find evidence of a crime in the vehicle.322 The court went on to
state that “anyone 21 years and older can now lawfully smoke
marijuana in California, and as [the officer] testified, the smell
can linger for more than a week.” 323 Further, the law “permits
possession and transportation of up to 28.5 grams of cannabis in
a car.” 324 Accordingly, the search of the vehicle was not upheld. 325
315
316
317
318
319

State v. Seckinger, 920 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Neb. 2018).
Id. at 846.
See id. at 850.

Id.
Id.

320 People v. Shumake, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 405, 408–09 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super.
Ct. 2019).
321 Id. at 407.
322 Id. at 410.
323
324
325

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The following year in United States v. Martinez, 326 another
California case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
found that the lower court erred by relying on pre-Proposition 64
(statewide recreational marijuana law) California cases held that
the odor of marijuana alone provides probable cause to search
for violations of state marijuana laws. 327 The court stated that
those cases were decided when possession of any quantity of
marijuana was unlawful under state law, which is no longer true
in California after recreational marijuana was passed. 328 The
court remanded the case and directed the trial court to
determine whether the facts known to the law enforcement
officer supported probable cause to believe that Martinez’s car
had evidence of a crime. 329 They went on to say that it was
conceivable that there was a violation of the California Health
and Safety Code, which prohibits an open container of marijuana
while operating a vehicle. 330 In sidestepping the issue of whether
there was probable cause to believe that there was a violation of
federal laws, the court stated “[w]e are a court of review, not first
view.” 331
In People v. Hill, 332 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a
vehicle search based upon the odor of marijuana. 333 There, after
a lawful stop, the officer told the occupants that he smelled raw
cannabis in the car, and defendant was asked to exit the
vehicle.334 Defendant was then patted down and asked to sit on
the curb next to the car. 335 A search of the vehicle produced an
unspecified amount of cannabis. 336 Defendant argued that
smelling cannabis cannot create probable cause because Illinois
decriminalized marijuana possession in amounts under ten
United States v. Martinez, 811 F. App’x 396, 397 (9th Cir. 2020).
See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 563 F. App’x 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2014);
U.S. v. Solomon, 528 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir. 1975); U.S. v. Barron, 472 F.2d 1215,
1217 (9th Cir. 1973).
328 Martinez, 811 F. App’x at 397.
329 Id. at 40.
330 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.3(a)(4) (West 1972).
331 Martinez, 811 F. App’x at 398.
332 People v. Hill, 162 N.E.3d 260 (Ill. 2020).
326
327

333
334
335
336

Id.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
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grams. 337 The Illinois Supreme Court cited In re O.S., 338 which
states that “decriminalization is not synonymous with
legalization” and that under Illinois law, the knowing possession
of cannabis is still a criminal offense under the CSA because the
possession of more than ten grams remains a crime subject to
criminal penalties. 339 The court pointed out that the defendant
failed to explain how a police officer “confronted with the
obvious odor of cannabis when he first approaches a vehicle, is
left to discern how much cannabis may be present by its smell
alone.” 340 The Illinois Supreme Court still considers the odor of
marijuana relevant to a probable cause determination and
“support[s] an inference that a crime is ongoing, even though
possession of one ounce or less” was legal. 341
The Illinois Supreme Court found the reasoning in Zuniga 342
applicable to Hill because a “substantial number of other
marijuana-related activities remain unlawful.” 343 However, the
Colorado Supreme Court has since decided the McKnight case,
discussed below, on the issue of the use of sniff dogs to detect
marijuana that may affect the Zuniga rationale and may
ultimately take the Illinois Supreme Court down a different
path. 344 Now that Illinois has legalized recreational marijuana,
the question is whether the Illinois Supreme Court change the
rationale that it adopted from the Zuniga case in People v. Hill. 345
The day after former New York Governor Andrew M.
Cuomo signed New York’s recreational marijuana law, 346 the New
York Police Department (“NYPD”) issued a Memorandum to all
police officers addressing the search of vehicles on the basis of
the odor of marijuana that stated in part:
337

Id.

People v. O.S. (In re O.S.), 112 N.E.3d 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
Id. at 633–34.
340 People v. Hill, 123 N.E.3d 1236, 1247 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
341 O.S., 112 N.E.3d at 633.
342 People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2016).
343 Id. at 1059.
344 People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 413 (Colo. 2019).
345 See People v. Hill, 162 N.E.3d 260 (Ill. 2020).
346 Rich Mendez, Gov. Andrew Cuomo Signs Bill to Legalize Recreational
Marijuana in New York, CNBC (Mar. 30, 2021, 7:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2021/03/30/new-york-state-senate-passes-bill-to-legalize-recreational-weed.html.
338
339
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Effective immediately, the smell of marihuana
alone no longer establishes probable cause of a
crime to search a vehicle. This change applies to
both burnt and unburnt marihuana. Searches of
vehicles related to marihuana enforcement may
only be conducted in accordance with the
following: driving while impaired by drugs: if the
driver appears to be under the influence of
marihuana and there is probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contains evidence of the impairing
marihuana (e.g. smell of burnt marihuana or
admission of having smoked recently), a search of
the passenger compartment of the vehicle is
permissible. However, the trunk may not be
searched unless the officer develops separate
probable cause to believe the trunk contains
evidence of a crime.347
This position is consistent with a recent New York appellate case
in which police officers smelled the odor of marijuana emanating
from a car, searched the console where they found a small
amount of marijuana, and then proceeded to search the trunk. 348
The court held that “the odor of marijuana, together with a de
minimis amount of marijuana found in the center console of the
vehicle, did not furnish the requisite probable cause to search the
trunk of defendant’s vehicle and that there was no factual nexus
between the possession of an amount of marijuana consistent with
personal consumption and a search for contraband in the trunk
of the vehicle.” 349
On the heels of this decision, in another New York appellate
case, officers smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from a
car and searched the console, where the officers found marijuana
and a bottle, which contained a significant amount of

347 Smertiuk Memorandum, supra note 126; see also Moore, supra note 126
(emphasis added).
348 People v. Ponder, 195 A.D.3d 123, 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
349 Id. at 124.
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Oxycodone.350 There, the court held that there was probable
cause to believe that additional drugs were being stored in the
car, including the trunk. 351 Neither of these two cases post-date
the newly enacted New York recreational marijuana law nor the
new NYPD police policy as stated above. It is interesting to keep
in mind that irrespective of the new NYPD policy, New York
courts are still free to make decisions on these issues should
cases, based upon the odor emanating from a car that results in a
search, come before them.
States have approached the use of “sniff dogs” or drugdetection dogs to detect drugs from the exterior of a vehicle
without a warrant with mixed results. Some states hold that the
use of a sniff dog to detect marijuana is a search, and some do
not. 352 Some states find that the sniff dog’s alert establishes
probable cause to search the vehicle, and some do not. Still,
other states extend further Fourth Amendment protections than
others. 353 The U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Caballes 354 held
that a sniff of a vehicle’s exterior by a trained narcotics dog is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment if conducted without
extending a traffic stop. 355
In Caballes, an officer led a
drug-detection dog around a vehicle that was lawfully stopped for
speeding.356 The dog alerted at the trunk, leading to a search
that revealed marijuana. 357
A series of cases have developed since Caballes. In Varner v.
Roane, 358 the court held police can have a drug-sniffing dog circle
a motor vehicle without individualized suspicion or a search
warrant. 359
In
United
States
v.
Jones, 360
a
drug-detection dog’s positive alert on a vehicle provided probable
350
351
352

People v. McCray, 195 A.D.3d 555, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).

Id.
See People v. Restrepo, 504 P.3d 983 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021); Fla v. Jardines,

569 U.S. 1 (2013).
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360

Id.

Ill. v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 406.

Id.

Varner v. Roane, 981 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 294.
United States v. Jones, 311 F. Supp. 3d 761 (E.D. Va. 2018).
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cause to search that vehicle.361 In Flora v. Southwest Iowa
Narcotics Enforcement Task Force, 362 “a drug dog sniff itself did
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, because
the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item in which a person maintains no inherent privacy
interest.” 363 These three cases pre-date the legalization of hemp
and the added issue of how the smell of hemp and marijuana
cannot be distinguished by a sniff dog.364
In some states, sniff dogs are now becoming obsolete. Sniff
dogs have been retired or repurposed in some states, such as
Virginia, Colorado, California, Michigan, and Massachusetts,
based on the legalization of marijuana in those states.365 Based
upon the adoption of a new marijuana possession law, Virginia is
set to retire fifteen drug-sniffing dogs “because these dogs are
trained to alert to the scent of cannabis” and “any alert is
interpreted by police . . . as probable cause to effect a search
under the Fourth Amendment.” 366 Further, the sniff dog cannot
discern “between a large amount of cannabis and a single joint,
and because a dog trained to detect both cocaine and marijuana
[cannot] inform its handler what was detected, the only path
forward for police narcotics units is to retire their drug-sniffing
dogs.” 367 When recreational marijuana was passed in New Mexico
361
362

2018).

Id. at 773.

Flora v. Sw. Iowa Narcotics Enf’t Task Force, 292 F. Supp. 3d 875 (S.D. Iowa

Id. at 890 n.13.
Bill Bush, Police Dogs Can’t Tell the Difference Between Hemp and
Marijuana,
AKRON
BEACON
J.
(Aug.
12,
2019,
4:27
PM),
363
364

https://www.beaconjournal.com/story/news/local/2019/08/12/police-dogs-can-x2019t/4481487007/; see also Denise Lavoie, Since the Nose Doesn’t Know Pot is Now
Legal, K-9s Retire, AP NEWS (May 29, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/va-statewire-police-marijuana-marijuana-legaliz; Chris Roberts, Marijuana Legalization Is
Retiring Police Dogs. Why That’s Good–And Why All K9 Drug Units Should Go.,
FORBES (May 30, 2021, 2:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisroberts/2021
/05/30/marijuana-legalization-is-retiring-police-dogs-why-thats-good-and-why-alldrug-k9-units-should-go/?sh=35d500ea3695ation253af1ba6e541060085108e027b367c1.
365 Peter Hermann & Justin Jouvenal, Decriminalization of Marijuana is
Pushing Pot-Sniffing Police Dogs Into Retirement, WASH. POST (Jul. 14, 2021, 5:28
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/police-canine-marijuanawashington/2021/07/14/f118eb66-e01c-11eb-ae31-6b7c5c34f0d6_story.html.
366 Roberts, supra note 364.
367 Roberts, supra note 364.
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in 2021, law enforcement also reconsidered using sniff dogs to
detect marijuana. 368
A sniff dog that alerts to marijuana in a state that has
legalized marijuana raises privacy issues and could lead to an
“unnecessary” search. 369 Hemp and marijuana “look and smell
alike” and police officers might not be able to determine whether
a search has unveiled hemp or marijuana without testing the
THC levels. 370 A sniff dog does not know the difference between
what is legal and what is not legal. As determined in People v.
McKnight, 371 a sniff dog cannot specifically distinguish between
marijuana and methamphetamine and the presence of both
drugs would “trigger the same response” from the sniff dog. 372
Properly distinguishing hemp versus marijuana could mean the
difference between a conviction or not, depending on the state
and whether it has decriminalized or legalized marijuana. 373
Legalization in Colorado has already impacted court
decisions involving marijuana and sniff dogs. In People v.
McKnight, 374 the Colorado Supreme Court, after Colorado passed
a recreational marijuana law where possession of an ounce or less
of marijuana by someone twenty-one or older is legal, found that
marijuana was no longer always “contraband” under state law. 375
There, police observed a parked pickup truck facing the wrong
way in a one-way alley and followed the truck as it traveled a few
blocks. 376 The truck then parked in front of a residence where
police had found drugs two months earlier, and it remained

Nathan O’Neal, 4 Investigates: Drug Sniffing Police Dogs’ Future in Limbo
of Marijuana, KOB 4 (May 20, 2021, 10:25 PM),
https://www.kob.com/new-mexico-news/4-investigates-drug-sniffing-police-dogsfuture-in-limbo-with-legalization-of-marijuana/6116175/.
368

with

369
370

Legalization

Id.
Legal Hemp, Pot’s Look-Alike, Creates Confusion for Police, CNBC (Mar.

28, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/28/legal-hemp-pots-look-alikecreates-confusion-for-police.html.
371 People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2019).
372 Id. at 399; Hermann, supra note 365.
373 See generally CNBC, supra note 370 (noting that, for example, hemp is
illegal under Idaho law whereas hemp is legal in Colorado and Kentucky).
374 McKnight, 446 P.3d at 399.
375 Id. at 401.
376 Id. at 400.
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parked there for fifteen minutes.377 During that time, no one
exited the truck or the residence.378 When the truck started
moving again, the officer followed it and observed a traffic
infraction. 379 The officer recognized the passenger as someone
who had previously used methamphetamine. 380 A sniff dog was
called to the scene and alerted the officers as to potential drug
contraband, including marijuana. 381 The officers next ordered
McKnight and the passenger to exit the truck, patted them down,
and found nothing on them; the officers then searched the truck
by hand. 382
The court concluded that, under the totality of the
circumstances, there was no probable cause justifying the use of
the dog to sniff McKnight’s truck or the subsequent hand search
of the truck. 383 The court reasoned that in legalizing marijuana
for adults twenty-one and older, Amendment 64 expanded the
protections of Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution
and provided a reasonable expectation of privacy to engage in
the lawful activity of possessing marijuana in Colorado. 384
Because there was no way to know whether the dog was alerting
to lawful marijuana or unlawful contraband, the sniff violated
McKnight’s reasonable expectation of privacy.385 Thus,
McKnight’s conviction was overturned because the dog had
alerted to drugs in the car but may have just alerted to the “legal
amount of marijuana” in the vehicle. 386
The Colorado Supreme Court further stated that
“[m]arijuana is now treated like guns, alcohol, and tobacco—
while possession of these items is lawful under some
circumstances, it remains unlawful under others.” 387 The court
went on to state that, “[a]lthough possession of guns, alcohol, and
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387

Id.
Id.
Id.
McKnight, 446 P.3d at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Hermann, supra note 365.
McKnight, 446 P.3d at 408.
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tobacco can be unlawful, persons still maintain an expectation of
privacy in lawfully using or consuming those items. The same
now goes for marijuana.” 388 In diverting from the U.S. Supreme
Court ruling in Caballes, the Colorado Supreme Court cited its
previous holding in Sporleder,389 stating, “we are not bound by
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment when determining the scope of state constitutional
protections.” 390
H. Search Incident to Arrest
The exception that authorizes a search incident to the
lawful 391 arrest of a person was recognized long before it was
iterated in Birchfield v. North Dakota. 392 The search incident to
arrest exception was first announced in Chimel v. California. 393
For the search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
the police must be armed with probable cause to believe that the
person subject to arrest has committed a felony or is committing
a felony or misdemeanor in the presence of the police. 394 The
388
389
390
391

Id.

People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo. 1983).
McKnight, 446 P.3d at 406 (quoting Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 140).

By its express terms, the condition precedent to a search incident
to arrest is that the police have made a lawful custodial arrest of
the person, that is, an arrest supported by probable cause that the
arrestee has committed or is committing a crime. . . . Because the
search is premised on probable cause to make the arrest, the first
question to be considered whenever such a search has been
conducted is whether the police had the requisite probable cause
before conducting the search.
Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 323 (2019) (citations omitted); see also id. at 323
(citing Rawlings v. Ky., 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (“stating that a search incident to
an arrest may precede the formal arrest so long as the police already have amassed
the requisite probable cause to make the arrest and the search is conducted
‘incident’ to the arrest.”)).
392 Birchfield v. N.D., 579 U.S. 438 (2016) (reasoning delineated in Schmerber
v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
393 Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752, 779 (1969).
394 See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369–70 (2003); see also United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 30 (1925)
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search
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justification of officer safety for this exception is long rooted in
U.S. Supreme Court cases. 395 The U.S. Supreme Court has also
held that it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person to
prevent the concealment of weapons or destruction of evidence. 396
Essentially, there are two types of warrantless searches that may
be made incident to a lawful arrest: a search of the arrestee’s
person and a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate
control. 397 Arizona v. Gant, 398 partially overruling Chimel, limited
searches justified by concerns of officer safety or the preservation
of evidence, to those areas within reaching distance at the time of
the search. 399
As discussed above, the Lewis case in Maryland is on appeal
and one of its questions for review is whether probable cause
existed to allow a search incident to arrest based solely on
the odor of marijuana. 400 The underlying Maryland Court of
Special Appeals agreed with the Maryland circuit court that
the odor of marijuana emanating from a person, like
the odor coming from a vehicle, was sufficient to establish
probable cause to perform a search incident to
arrest. 401 However, the dissent in the lower court decision drew a
distinction between the types of searches and noted that there are
several benign reasons one might smell like marijuana without
having the contraband on their person.402 Some identified issues
related to the “plain smell” doctrine and marijuana include: the
odor may not be current, odors are mobile, the source of the
odor may not be identifiable, the confusion with the hemp odor
for both law enforcement and sniff dogs, the lack of quick testing
the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by
which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to
effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.
395 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1964).
396 See Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373, 383 (2014).
397 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); State v. Byrd, 310 P.3d
793, 795–96 (Wash. 2019).
398 Ariz. v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
399 Id. at 351.
400 See Lewis v. State, 233 A.3d 86, 95 (Md. 2020).
401 Id.
402 Id.
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methods, and the potential for discriminatory stops. 403
V.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE & GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION

All these exceptions to a warrant requirement do not amount
to much if they do not have an impact in a criminal case. If a
search is found to be unconstitutional by a court of law, the court
will typically exclude or suppress seized evidence against the
defendant from admissibility against them at trial. 404 That is, if a
warrant is found to be invalid, or reasonable suspicion for a stop
or probable cause for a search did not meet legal requirements, it
will be deemed a Fourth Amendment violation. 405
This
suppression of evidence is legally known as the exclusionary rule
as set forth in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio, 406 which has its roots in the
long-standing doctrine known as “fruits of the poisonous tree.” 407
There are a couple of exceptions to the good faith
exception. First, for a search conducted with a warrant, the
search may be upheld if the warrant has some flaws unbeknownst
to the officer when executing it and the officer in good faith. 408
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a court can consider
evidence obtained from a search that appeared to have a lawful
basis, such as a search supported by a warrant. 409 If the warrant
later turns out to have been invalid, the police may not be held
accountable for conducting a search while relying on it. 410
403 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251145, SPECIAL REPORT: CONTACTS BETWEEN
POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 4 (2018); German Lopez, After Legalization, Black
People are Still Arrested at Higher Rates for Marijuana Than White People, VOX
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/29/16936908/
marijuana-legalizationracial-disparities-arrests; Race & Justice News: Blacks
Disproportionately Arrested for Marijuana in Alabama, SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct.
30,
2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/race-justice-news-blacksdisproportionately-arrested-marijuana-alabama/; see also Matt, supra note 257,
at 459 (providing insight on issues and recommendations related to “plain smell”
and marijuana).
404 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
405

See id.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961).
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
408 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
409 See id. at 238–39 (2011).
406
407

410

Id.
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Another exception is when an officer takes steps based on the
existing interpretation of the law, but a court later rules that the
law should be interpreted differently; there the police may be
found to have acted in good faith. 411 Some states do not apply
this good faith exception in their courts, while other states apply
a limited version of the exception. This is because states have a
right to provide greater liberties to their citizens under their own
state constitutions than those contained in the U.S. Constitution.
VI.

OTHER SEARCH SETTINGS

A. Body Specimens
Searches related to automobiles arise in yet another context,
that is, the taking and testing of body specimens from drivers
without a warrant. A cadre of U.S. Supreme Court cases came
forward from 2012–2019 addressing this issue. 412 In Missouri v.
McNeely, 413 the driver was stopped by a highway patrolman for
speeding, failed several field sobriety tests, and was asked to
submit to an alcohol breath test, which he refused. 414 The driver
was then transported to a medical clinic where the clinic staff
administered a blood test without the suspect’s consent and
without a warrant. 415 The issue in the case was whether a law
enforcement officer may obtain a nonconsensual and warrantless
blood sample from a drunk driver under the exigent
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement based upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the
bloodstream.416 The U.S. Supreme Court, in affirming the
Missouri Supreme Court, held that “in drunk-driving
investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the
bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case

411 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984); contra Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551 (2004).
412 See, e.g., Miss. v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013); Birchfield v. N.D., 136 S.
Ct. 2160 (2016); Mitchell v. Wis., 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2530–31 (2019); Ill. v. Andreas,
463 U.S. 765 (1983).
413 Miss. v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).
414 Id. at 145.
415 Id. at 146.
416 Id. at 147.
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sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.” 417
A few years later in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 418 along with
invaliding an implied consent statute that imposed criminal
penalties for refusing to submit to a blood test, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be
administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk
driving. 419 The Court reasoned that a blood test is not only more
invasive than a breath test, but also more intrusive because it
reveals too much information about the defendant. 420 The U.S.
Supreme Court revisited body specimen searches once again in
Mitchell v. Wisconsin.421 There, the Court held that the exigent
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement almost always permits a blood test without a warrant
where the driver suspected of drunk driving is unconscious, and
therefore cannot be given a breath test. 422
It is also noteworthy to briefly address the “plain view”
doctrine in the context of warrantless searches of automobiles.
Before any state decriminalized or legalized medical and
recreational marijuana, in Illinois v. Andreas,423 a large, locked
metal container, shipped by air from Calcutta to respondent in
Chicago, was opened by a customs officer at the airport, who
found marijuana concealed in a compartment. 424
A Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent confirmed that it was
marijuana. 425 “The next day, the DEA agent and a Chicago police
officer posed as delivery men and delivered the container to
respondent, leaving it in the hallway outside his
apartment. . . . the container was reopened and the marihuana
found inside the table was seized” 426 The warrantless reopening
of the container following its reseizure did not violate

417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426

Id. at 165 (emphasis added).

Birchfield v. N.D., 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
Id. at 2185–86.
Id. at 2184.
Mitchell v. Wis., 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2530–31 (2019).
Id. at 2539.
Ill. v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983).

Id.
See id.
See id.
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respondent’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. 427 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that an officer may search an individual’s
vehicle when the officer can see incriminatory evidence in the car
from outside of the car. 428
B. Schools
School policies are amid change with respect to medical
marijuana use and possession on school grounds. Under certain
conditions, some schools now permit medical marijuana to be
administered, used, and stored in schools. 429 While there is a rise
in marijuana use among college students, according to several
sources, however, marijuana use by youth has not increased with
the legalization of marijuana. 430 Nonetheless, without a school
sanction for medical marijuana use and possession on school
grounds, illegal marijuana possession continues to be an issue in
schools, prompting Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues
both pre- and post-marijuana decriminalization and
legalization. 431
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
427
428
429

Law

See id.
Id. at 771.
See Jenna Bourne, 9 Out Of 10 Tampa Bay School Districts are Breaking
Meant to Help Sick Kids, WTSP (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:35 PM),

https://www.wtsp.com/article/news/investigations/10-investigates/tampa-bay-areaschool-medical-marijuana-policy/67-c58d1872-cad6-4dfd-8844-a47ccf01d13b;
Madeline Coats, Medical Marijuana Could be Allowed on School Grounds, DAILY
WORLD (Jan. 14, 2019, 7:00 PM), http://www.thedailyworld.com/news/medicalmarijuana-could-be-allowed-on-school-grounds/; Frances Rogers & Kate S. Im,

Cannabis in the Classroom: Navigating the Administration of Medical Marijuana
on Campus Under New California Law, LAW.COM (Feb. 20, 2020, 4:55 PM),

https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/02/20/cannabis-in-the-classroom-navigatingthe-administration-of-medical-marijuana-on-campus-under-new-california-law/?
slreturn=20200121151743; see also FLA. STAT. § 1006.062 (3)(8) (2021); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 49414.1(b) (Deering 2020).
430 Marijuana Use at Historic High Among College-Aged Adults in 2020, NAT’L
INSTS.
HEALTH
(Sept.
8,
2021),
https://www.nih.gov/news-events/newsreleases/marijuana-use-historic-high-among-college-aged-adults-2020; Kyle Jaeger,

Teen Marijuana Use Is Not Increasing As More States Legalize, Another Federal
Study
Shows,
MARIJUANA
MOMENT
(Oct.
28,
2021),

https://www.marijuanamoment.net/teen-marijuana-use-is-not-increasing-as-morestates-legalize-another-federal-study-shows/ (noting numerous state and federal
sources demonstrating that “legalization does not lead to increase[d] youth use
despite prohibitionist arguments to the contrary”).
431 See generally Jason E. Yearout, Individualized School Searches and the
Fourth Amendment: What’s a School District To Do?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
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on unreasonable
searches and seizures applies
to
searches
conducted by school officials. 432
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 433 the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the standard for warrantless school searches in holding
that “[n]either the warrant requirement nor the probable cause
standard is appropriate.” 434 Instead, “a simple reasonableness
standard governs all searches of students’ persons and effects by
school authorities.” 435 The Court further explained that school
authorities are permitted “to regulate their conduct according to
the dictates of reason and common sense.” 436
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the parameters of a
warrantless search of a school student in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 437
There, an assistant vice principal conducted a search of a
student’s purse for the cigarettes based upon a report that the
student was smoking in the school lavatory in violation of school
policy. 438 In the purse, the assistant vice principal found
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and other evidence of marijuana
dealing activities. 439 The U.S. Supreme Court iterated that public
school teachers function as agents of the state, and not merely
agents of the students’ parents. 440 Thus, the Fourth Amendment
applies to their actions. 441 The Court also established the
following test to determine the reasonableness of a
search: whether the search was (1) “justified at its inception,” and
(2) as the search was conducted, whether it was related in scope
to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place. 442 A search will be “permissible in its scope” when “the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
489 (2002) (discussing the issues of marijuana in schools as related to the Fourth
Amendment).
432 N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985).
433
434

See generally id.
Public Schools, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-

04/22-public-schools.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2022).
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442

Id.
T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 364.
See id. at 327–28.
Id. at 328, 345.
See id. at 328.
Id. at 336–74.
Id.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
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search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of
the student and the nature of the infraction.” 443
The Court in T.L.O. found that the report provided to the
assistant vice principal accusing the student of smoking
warranted a reasonable suspicion that she had cigarettes in her
purse, and thus the search was justified at its inception. 444
Further, the discovery of drug paraphernalia in the student’s
purse gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that she was carrying
marijuana in her purse.445 This justified a further exploration of
the purse that turned up more evidence of marijuana-related
activities.446 In this case, both prongs of the T.L.O. test were met,
and the search was upheld. 447
A search may be reasonable at its inception, but not
reasonable in scope. It would stand to reason then that if the
search is unreasonable at its inception, the court need not
consider the second prong of the test related to the scope of the
search, and, that if the search is reasonable at its inception, but
the scope of the search is unreasonable, the search will not be
upheld. These propositions are best demonstrated in the
following two cases.
In Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 school officials performed a “preannounced search of all students’ bags for security purposes.” 449
This search “revealed a package of cigarettes in Phaneuf’s purse,”
which was prohibited by school policy. 450 A student reported to a
teacher that Phaneuf told her and other students that she
possessed marijuana. 451 Phaneuf told the other student that she
planned to hide the marijuana “down her pants” during the
mandatory bag check. 452 After receiving this information from
the student, the teacher reported the statement to the

443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452

Id. at 342.
Id. at 345.
See id.
Id. at 329–30.
See id. at 331–32.

Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 592–93.
Id. at 593.
Id.
See id.
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principal. 453 The principal subjected Phaneuf to a strip search. 454
The issue was “whether the school officials had a reasonably high
level of suspicion that Phaneuf had marijuana on her person to
justify an intrusive, potentially degrading strip search.” 455
Unlike in T.L.O., where marijuana and drug paraphernalia
were found as contents of the student’s purse, the search of
Phaneuf’s purse only discovered cigarettes and a lighter. 456 The
Court “believe[d] that the discovery of this particular contraband
ha[d] such a tenuous connection to the alleged marijuana on her
person to be of relatively little consequence in deciding whether
the strip search for drugs was reasonable.” 457 Consequently, the
Court concluded that the search was not justified at its inception,
and therefore, the scope of the strip search did not need to be
addressed. 458
In contrast, in D.H. v. Clayton County Sch. Dist., 459 a
warrantless strip search of a student for marijuana was justified at
its inception while forcing the student to strip fully naked in front
of his peers was unconstitutionally excessive in scope. 460 Even
where a student strip search is justified at its inception, the
Fourth Amendment still requires the execution of the search to
be reasonable in scope. 461 While some of these cases involved
searching purses, the same approach would apply to backpacks,
lockers, or any other possessions owned by a student, and thus
would all be subjected to the T.L.O. analysis. 462
Public schools and colleges also face marijuana search issues
in the context of mandatory drug testing. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that a school district’s student-athlete drug policy,
which authorized random urinalysis drug testing of students who
participated in its athletic programs, did not violate students’
federal or state constitutional right to be free from
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462

See id.
Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 593.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 600.

D.H. v. Clayton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1318.
Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).

See id.
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unreasonable searches. 463
In Vernonia School Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 464 the Court reasoned that the school district had an
immediate, legitimate concern in preventing student-athletes
from using drugs, invasion of student privacy interest was
negligible, and the district was not required to come up with a
less intrusive search. 465 Likewise, students who are studying
health and other medical professions, like nursing, are subject to
mandatory drug testing but not without growing legal
challenges. 466
Some colleges, due to the passage of medical marijuana laws,
have permitted the possession of medical marijuana on campus.
An Arizona State University police officer arrested student
Juwaun Maestas after the officer observed Maestas sitting on a
road near his on-campus dormitory. 467 The officer found a valid
Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (hereinafter “AMMA”) registry
identification card in Maestas’s wallet. 468 “After Maestas admitted
that he had marijuana in his dorm room, the officer obtained a
search warrant, searched Maestas’s dorm room, and found . . . 0.4
grams of marijuana.” 469 The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that
the state cannot criminally charge public college students for
having and using marijuana on campus if they have a medical
marijuana card. 470 The court reasoned that banning medical
marijuana on college campuses violated the Arizona
Constitution’s protections for voter-approved laws referring to
the AMMA. 471

463 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002); contra York v. Wahkiakum
Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995, 997 (Wash. 2008) (not followed on state grounds).
464 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
465 Id. at 662.
466 Ben Walker, Girl Expelled for Using Medical Marijuana is Suing Her
College, STONER THINGS (Nov. 17, 2019), https://stonerthings.com/girl-expelledmedical-marijuana-suing-college/.
467 State v. Maestas, 417 P.3d 774, 776 (Ariz. 2018).
468 Id.
469 Id.
470 Id. at 779.
471 Id. at 776.

CELESTE (DO NOT DELETE)

552

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

9/15/2022 9:05 PM

[Vol. 46:3

C. Workplaces
In workplaces, cannabis search and seizure issues arise in the
context of searches of people, places, things, and the taking and
testing of body specimens like blood, urine, and oral fluids. The
constitutionality of those searches is dependent upon whether the
search is related to a public (governmental) or private employer, with
searches by public employers treated differently than searches
conducted by law enforcement.472 The Fourth Amendment search
and seizure protections and standards for public employees are the
same as protections afforded to students in public schools, which is
consistent with the school search standards set out in the twopronged test from T.L.O.473 In O’Connor v. Ortega, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that: (1) “public employer intrusions on
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government
employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as
for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged
by a standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances,” and
(2) should be reasonable both in its inception and in its scope. 474
This protection to public employees has extended to a
search of employees’ persons, desks, and other effects including
the taking and testing of body specimens. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that “the collection and subsequent analysis of . . .
biological samples must be deemed Fourth Amendment
searches.” 475
There are some categories of constitutionally
permissible “suspicionless” searches that will automatically be
upheld for the taking of body specimens to test for drugs
(including marijuana) in the workplace. 476 For example, in
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 477 the U.S.
Customs Service mandatory drug screening requiring urinalysis
472 Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec’s. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (discussing public
governmental searches); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (discussing
private employment searches).
473 See N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
474 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26.
475 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618.
476 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308–09 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); see also Tamburelli v. Hudson Cnty. Police
Dep’t, 742 A.2d 560, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
477 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
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tests of U.S. Customs Service employees seeking transfer or
promotion to positions having a direct involvement in drug
interdiction was permissible. 478 The “Government’s compelling
interests in preventing the promotion of drug users to positions
where they might endanger the integrity of our Nation’s
borders . . . outweigh the privacy interests of those who seek
promotion to these positions.” 479
Additionally,
there
are
mandatory
drug
testing
requirements, which include testing for marijuana, in federal
safety-sensitive employment positions such as truckers with the
Department of Transportation. 480 Under the Federal Drug-Free
Workplace Act, federal employers are bound by the fact that
marijuana is still considered illegal federally, and therefore
federal employers implement zero-tolerance policies for all drugs
including marijuana. 481 Thus far, and even in the face of state
medical marijuana laws, employees bringing actions under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which is an employee protection
law, have lost their civil actions due to the federal illegality of
marijuana. 482
On the other hand, private employers, as non-governmental
entities, are left to establish their own drug testing policies,
including but not limited to, zero-tolerance, random and
suspicion-based testing. Some private employers will deny
potential employee hires or fire an employee based on positive
marijuana test results, while others will not test for it at all. As
more state medical marijuana laws carve out protections for
employees who legally use medical marijuana, more employment

478
479

Id. at 671.
Id. at 679.

E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
See generally 41 U.S.C. § 8102; see also Procedures for Transportation
Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.transportation.gov/odapc/part40 (last visited May 26, 2022) (referring
to 49 C.F.R Part 40, which describes the “required procedures for conducting
workplace drug and alcohol testing for the Federally regulated transportation
industry.”).
482 See, e.g., Baustian v. La., 910 F. Supp. 274, 275 (E.D. La. 1996); Johnson v.
Columbia Falls Aluminum Co., No. DA 08–0358, 2009 WL 865308 (Mont. Mar. 31,
2009); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 230 P.3d 518,
535 (Or. 2010) (en banc).
480
481
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cases are developing.483 Employees are bringing actions against
employers for the use of medical marijuana by utilizing state
discrimination statutes, 484 disability statutes, 485 off-duty conduct
statutes, 486 and even housing statutes, 487 with mixed results. Some
courts point to the federal illegality of marijuana and rule against
the employee, some point to medical marijuana statutes that
either protect the employer or employee, while some look to
disability, discrimination, and off-duty conduct statutes for
guidance.488
VII.

CONCLUSION

We are at an impasse with legal hemp and CBD, state
decriminalization and legalizations of marijuana, and federally
illegal marijuana. Oddly, legal CBD can be extracted from the
illegal marijuana plant in addition to the legal hemp plant. This
is further compounded by the removal of hemp from the CSA
and the resulting propagation of CBD products. These products
Arizona, California, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New
York, Rhode Island, and Connecticut have medical marijuana statutes with
employee protections. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2807, 36-2813, 36-2814
(2016); A.B. 2069 (inactive bill) (Cal. 2018); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4905A,
4907A, 4921A (2011); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 130/40 (2019); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E (2009); MINN. STAT. § 152.32 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 453A.800 (2020); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3360–3369-D (McKinney 2021); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 1004.18 (2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 21, § 2128.6-4 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-408p (2012); see also Jay Starkman,
What
New
Marijuana
Laws
Mean
for
Employers,
BUS.
J.,
http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/how-to/growth-strategies/2016/12/what-newmarijuana-laws-mean-for-employers.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
484 See, e.g., Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp., No. PC-2014-5680, 2017
WL 2321181, at *1, *5–7 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 23, 2017).
485 See, e.g., Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., 241 N.J. 285, 287 (2020);
Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods., 134 P.3d 161, 162 (Or. 2006).
486 See, e.g., Coats v. Dish Network, LLC., 2015 CO 44, ¶ 15; see also Scott
Horton, New York Law Protects Employee Marijuana Use, JD SUPRA (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-law-protects-employee-1275108/.
487 See Discrimination Laws Regarding Off-Duty Conduct, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGIS.
(Oct. 18, 2010), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/employ/offdutyconductdiscrimination.pdf; Newton v. Equilon Enterprises LLC, 411 F. Supp.
3d 856 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
488 See Kathryn J. Russo, Alabama Enacts Medical Marijuana Law, NAT’L L. REV.
(May 25,
2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/alabama-enacts-medicalmarijuana-law.
483
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are not always accurate in representing THC concentrations
which sometimes results in a positive test for THC.
Consequently, this causes unintended negative legal outcomes in
the workplace, in the criminal justice system, and at a personal
level.
The decriminalization and legalization of marijuana and
hemp is also testing the boundaries of established principles of
warrants and warrantless searches. Due to the similarities of the
sight and smell of hemp and marijuana, hemp legalization is
causing confusion in a variety of settings, particularly on the
roadways where the “plain view” and “plain smell” doctrines, as
exceptions to the warrant requirement, are prevalent. A law
enforcement’s or sniff dog’s identification of hemp versus
marijuana by sight or smell is now more complex.
Additionally, with this decriminalization and legalization, law
enforcement can no longer assume that the odor of marijuana is
due to something nefarious that involves illegal activity or illegal
contraband. Some courts espouse that even if possession of
marijuana is legal, there is no way to know if the amount
possessed exceeds the permissible legal amount. Some courts
mandate something more than odor alone to form the basis for
probable cause for a search. A court’s stance toward this issue
may either validate or invalidate a search. The courts often
discuss the status of marijuana state decriminalization and
legalization laws in their marijuana search decisions. The scope
of a search in the context of marijuana is also being addressed in
the courts. The legal standards for the scope of a marijuana
search vary and may be dependent upon where the search occurs,
with some cases being more stringent in scope and others more
liberal in scope.
The state legalization of cannabis and federal legalization of
hemp is impacting how searches are conducted in stop and frisks,
homes, land, curtilage, vehicles, schools, workplaces, body specimens,
and other scenarios, and is fluctuating exceptions to the search
warrant requirement. Legalization is also impacting exceptions to
the warrant requirement including the “automobile exception,” the
“open fields” doctrine exception, the “exigent circumstances”
exception, and the search incident to arrest exception, with varying
outcomes.
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While states continue to move to decriminalize, legalize, or
regulate recreational and medical marijuana, the schism between
the states and the federal government continues. As a result,
issues related to marijuana in all regards, and pinpointedly on
the topic of search and seizure, remain in flux. Even if the U.S.
Supreme Court renders opinions on developing search and
seizure issues, states may still rule under their own constitutions
and grant their citizens more expansive Fourth Amendment
rights than the federal Constitution. While the courts, including
the U.S. Supreme Court, grapple with marijuana search and
seizure issues, until and unless marijuana is declassified or
reclassified and hemp is placed back into the CSA, which is
unlikely on both accounts, this confusing and ever-changing
landscape will persist.
In the words of conservative Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas,
If the Government is now content to allow States to
act “as laboratories” and try novel social and
economic experiments then it might no longer
have authority to intrude on [t]he States’ core
police powers . . . to define criminal law and to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their
citizens.
A prohibition on intrastate use or
cultivation of marijuana may no longer be
necessary or proper to support the Federal
Government’s piecemeal approach. 489

489 Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2236, 2238 (Jun. 28,
2021); See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005).

